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COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS 
IN THE COURTS 
By T. RICHARD WITMER t 
"CONTRACT" is a word of large and varied social import. Hand in 
hand under its patronage march agreements to marry and yellow-dog 
contracts, entirely personal contracts of suretyship and mass production 
life insurance policies, agreements with the Federal government to restrict 
acreage and agreements by employees not to compete with employers 
after leaving the job, contracts for the sale of goods or for personal 
services and the supposititious agreements existing between the stock- 
holders of one of our modern corporate giants and the corporation, be- 
tween the corporation and the state, between the state and the stock- 
holders, and, for good measure, among the stockholders themselves. 
Any formula which can tie all of these and dozens more into a single 
concept must be very much of an abstraction. It is. The reality comes 
out only when, and only to the extent that, courts and legislatures look 
at the individual bargain in question and read it not as a contract but 
as one type of contract. Though the basic formula-the words that are 
used-may remain the same, the application of the formula becomes 
many-hued. Is this an agreement between employer and employee? Then 
it is to be construed strongly against the employer. Is it a contract of 
insurance? Then the legislature has said that certain clauses must appear 
in it or, failing to make such an appearance, shall be read there in any 
event. Is it an agreement between husband and wife? Perhaps it was 
not "meant" to be enforced in the courts. Is it a contract for the sale 
of goods? Then in case of breach we leave the plaintiff to his action 
for damages. Or is it for the sale of land? Then specific performance 
is open to him. So one can go down the line picking one's way through 
the precedents, finding differing remedies for differing types of contract 
(some conditioned only, or too much, by history; others showing signs 
of real contemporary social intuition), feeling the lean of the court one 
way or another, hearing it sometimes avow such earnings explicitly, rarely 
disturbing the age-old familiar words, occasionally doing so. 
It is in terms of contract, then, that the collective bargain reaches 
the courts when it reaches them at all.' No other formula has appeared 
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. For previous periodical literature on this subject in general, see Anderson, Col- 
lective Bargaining Agreements (1936) 15 ORE. L. REV. 229; Christenson, Legally Enforce- 
able Interests in American Labor Union Working Agreements (1933) 9 IND. L. J. 69; 
Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 753; 
Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1925) 10 ST. Louis L. REv. 1; 
Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements Under Administrative Regulation of Employment 
(1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 493; Hamilton, Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor 
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ready-made for the purpose. No other formula gives so close a fit or 
needs so little cutting and patching to give a tolerably good fit. But cut- 
ting and patching there must be if the fit is to be really good. For, looked 
at in the large, the collective bargain is like nothing that the law has 
ever had to deal with before.2 If, from some particular angle, it may 
resemble something else with which the courts are more familiar, its 
total effect is considerably different from any of them. Thus, though 
one could compare it with, say, a group insurance contract if one viewed 
it only as an agreement between a multiplicity of workers on the one 
side and a single employer on the other, one has also to compare it with 
a cooperative marketing contract if it is looked at chiefly as a device for 
preventing competition among the union members. One could compare 
it with a minimum wage statute if one were interested in it as a device 
for fixing a figure below which employers will not be permitted to go in 
hiring people as well as for limiting competition among employees, but 
one might also compare it with the agreements made between any local 
telephone company and its customers if one is thinking of the union as 
a monopolizer of labor. If one looks at it as a device for preventing 
competition among common purchasers of the union's only marketable 
product, labor, one will compare it with contemporary fair trade statutes 
and contracts made under their authority, but if one's interest and attitude 
is that of a supposedly typical employer one almost immediately begins 
to think of the manner of its formation in terms of "coercion", "duress" 
and similar words of tort-content. 
If none of the analogies that have been adduced fits the picture com- 
pletely, it would be strange if such an all-inclusive notion as that conjured 
up by the mere word "contract" would do so automatically. That contract 
doctrine can be made to cover it, there is little doubt. It would be odd 
if a doctrine which already covers so great a variety of human transac- 
tions could not be revamped sufficiently to embrace still another. But it 
would be still more odd if a doctrine moulded in feudal society, adapted 
to commercial life, and only recently encountering industrial society, would 
give precisely the desired results immediately. It is this process of adapta- 
tion that we are going through today. Fifty years ago probably not one 
Contracts (1938) 3 Mo. L. REV. 252; Mason, Organized Labor as Party Plaintiff in 
Injunction Cases (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 466; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in 
American Law (1931) 44 HARV. L. REV. 572; Witte, Labor's Resort to Injunctions 
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 374; Comments (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 409, (1931) 31 COL. L. 
REV. 1156, (1930) 16 CORN. L. Q. 96, (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 520, (1934) 18 MARQ. 
L. REV. 251, (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221. 
2. This statement, I think, is equally true whether one regards the collective bar- 
gain as "ultimately" nothing more than a truce along a particular front in a class 
struggle, or as the formal constitution of a system of industrial democracy, or as the 
-final expression of business unionism. With such "ultimates" there is no concern here. 
Nor is there concern with whether the collective bargain is "really" a contract. See 
Duguit, (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 753, 763 (arguing that it is not) . 
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court in the country had heard of a collective bargain in its official ear. 
Twenty years ago the debate was whether collective bargains ought to 
be enforced.3 Today the question is how they shall be enforced, by whom 
they shall be enforced, to what effect they shall be enforced, and how far 
all the collateral doctrine that clusters about the abstract notion of an 
abstract contract between an abstract A and an abstract B shall be carried 
over and applied to the newest of the progeny. 
If it is important that the collective bargain be characterized in its social 
content, it is equally important that such a characterization recognize 
that "collective bargain" is itself a broad term covering a multitude of 
socially different cases. A collective agreement between the General Elec- 
tric Company and its workers at Schenectady will be more important in 
regulating the daily life of the city than almost any ordinance the city 
fathers could adopt; an agreement between the owners of a theatre in 
Hattiesburg, Miss.-population 18,000-and its employees will have no 
such consequence. A collective agreement between the United Mine 
Workers and the operators of the central competitive field may affect the 
price of coal as much as a ruling by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
on freight rates; an agreement between the employees of the Hamilton 
Watch Company and the corporation will be of comparatively slight sig- 
nificance except to the immediate parties. Organization of the textile 
workers of the country, followed by collective agreements, will put the 
Federal wages and hours bill in the shade, silence, to the extent that cheap 
labor is responsible for the migration, those New Englanders who look 
at the departure of industry from their bailiwicks with horror, transfer 
the setting of differentials in wage rates from a public body to a "private" 
group and obviate the constitutional qualms of those who see a threat 
to states' rights in the legislation; organization of the linoleum workers 
in the United States will mean little more than a lessening of competition 
at the wage level within an oligopolistic industry. Collective bargaining 
in the steel towns of the Monongahela Valley will do a good deal towards 
restoring democracy to local government; collective bargaining by the 
grocery clerks of the same towns will do nothing of the sort. An agree- 
ment between a solvent Amoskeag Cotton Mills and its employees ought, 
in not too long a run, to give the latter some standing in a bankruptcy 
court alongside of or in opposition to the bondholders' protective com- 
mittees; an agreement in an already defunct or decadent industry will at 
best postpone the effects of rigor mortis industrialis on innocent third 
parties. 
One can not, then, hope to gather up within the mere words "collective 
bargain" all varieties of collective bargains any more than one can com- 
prehend within the word "corporation" all the social significance its 
3. See Christenson, (1933) 9 IND. L. J. 69, 70; Fuchs, (1925) 10 ST. Louis L. 
REV. 1, 7. 
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numerous species have in practice. One can, however,-summarizing what 
has already been said and adding a little-set down two or three of its 
distinguishing characteristics: It will, in any case, lessen or eliminate 
competition locally among the workers in a given plant. If the industry 
is nation-wide and the collective bargaining system is of equal expanse, 
it will serve in that industry some of the functions that a minimum wage 
statute serves, viz., elimination of competition at the wage level and pro- 
vision for some minimum standard of living and working for those em- 
ployed in it. It will be in most cases a bargain made unwillingly by one 
side, a bargain made only when there appears to be no possibility of 
avoiding it save at the cost of a long fight; it will, by the same token, 
be a bargain not to be renewed unless there is the same pressure.4 It 
will be, for the other side, a vital necessity if the purposes of unionism 
are to be served at all. It will be a bargain in brief made without readily 
available alternatives for either side-none for the employer unless he is 
willing to fight; none for the union because, until it has the whole industry 
signed up, it faces competition not only from non-members who offer 
to work for less on jobs now controlled by the union but also from non- 
members working in unorganized plants whose products compete with 
those of plants in which the union does prevail. 
There is no compelling reason why collective bargains should be en- 
forced by courts or other public agencies.5 Though a few judges have 
4. For an indication of the extent to which the collective bargaining system was 
sabotaged in the early 1920's, see the earlier volumes of LAW AND LABOR. Case after 
case follows the pattern: "The plaintiff had a collective agreement with the X union 
which expired on May 1, 1922. Thoroughly dissatisfied with it, he decided not to renew 
it and announced this to his employees. On May 1, they went on strike and picketed the 
plant. The plaintiff sought an injunction against this violence and intimidation 
5. No attempt is made hereafter to deal with methods of enforcement, as, for ex- 
ample, arbitration, other than those provided by public agencies. See Oliver, The Arbi- 
tration of Labor Disputes (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 206; Phillips, The Function of 
Arbitration in the Settlement of Industrial Disputes (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1366; 
Tongue, The Development of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Under Trade Agree- 
ments (1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. 263; see note 45 infra. Nor is specific reference made 
hereafter to the function of the National Labor Relations Board as a contract-enforcing 
agency. Though breach of an agreement does not per se give the employees a cause of 
action against the employer before the Board, a refusal by an employer to bargain before 
he commits the breach has been held by the Board to be an unfair labor practice. Matter 
of Chicago Defender, 1 N. L. R. B. (old) 119, 121 (1934) ; Matter of Louis Hornick & 
Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 983, 994 (1937). The Board has also held that the purpose of the 
Act requires that the employer discuss changes in the terms of the agreement proposed 
by the union and that a refusal to discuss such changes will be an unfair labor practice 
even though the refusal is followed by a breach of the agreement on the part of the 
union. Matter of The Sands Manufacturing Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 546, 562 (1936), order 
set aside, N. L. R. B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 96 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), 
cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 10 (1938). Though the breach may leave the union open to 
an action for damages or for an injunction, this does not deprive the Board of its juris- 
diction. In view of the stated aim of the Act-the maintenance of a free flow of com- 
merce unimpeded by industrial strife--it would be hard to find fault with this policy. 
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suggested that unless they enforce the bargain it would be a useless and 
meaningless thing,6 this must be taken largely as a clearing of the throat 
in the face of a new situation, as a justification for embarking on a new 
and strange voyage. In commercial life, breach of contract is normally 
the occasion for nothing at all; it is taken for granted that, for the most 
part, no attention will be paid to breaches. Probably the next most fre- 
quent occurrence is a resort to a negative variety of self-help, typified 
by the If-he-doesn't-want-to-live-up-to-his-agreements,-I-simply-won't- 
deal-with-him-anymore attitude. Only in desperation is there a resort to 
the courts. 
Pari pass the chances are that even if courts did not see their way clear 
to enforce collective bargains their status in actual life would be much 
what it is today. Most of them would be lived up to even if the parties 
knew that there was no legal sanction behind them. The petty breaches 
would be ignored by both sides. The major breaches, after strong and 
repeated protests failed, would be solved on the part of the union by 
striking and on the part of the employers by an announced refusal to 
deal with an "irresponsible" body and a lockout.7 An optimist might be 
tempted to say, then, that resort to the courts to remedy breaches of col- 
lective agreements is a sign of increasing good will and confidence, of a 
willingness to substitute orderly means for the more turbulent strike or 
lockout. A cynic might be tempted to say that it is only when it looks as 
though these latter methods will fail or after they have failed that anyone 
ever asks the help of a stranger to the agreement-the court.8 Strangers 
the courts are today, but strangers they are not remaining. For an in- 
creasingly large number of possible controversies are being settled in 
this way. 
As a matter of fact there has been comparatively little dispute in the 
courts as to whether collective agreements are enforceable.9 Either it has 
been taken for granted that they are or the objections to enforcement have 
been brushed aside with but little discussion. When the suit was brought 
by the union, however, some of the earlier cases refused enforcement on 
the ground that the wrong remedy had been asked for. Such, for instance, 
6. See Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local, No. 615, 174 Miss. 439, 
447, 164 So. 887, 890 (1936); Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 24 Ohio N. P. 
(N. S.) 193, 199 (1922). But see Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. [1931] A. C. 83, 89 
(P. C.); Bancroft v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 30 Manitoba 401, 408 (1920). 
7. On the law of self-help in these labor cases, see notes 51 ff. infra. 
8. See David Adler & Sons Co. v. Maglio, 200 Wis. 153, 158, 228 N. W. 123, 125 
(1929). See note 52, infra. 
9. It is assumed hereafter that some means-generally statutory-is provided for 
suits by and against unincorporated unions. 
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was the case of Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell,10 in which 
the plaintiff union, attempting to turn Lumley v. Wagner"1 around back- 
wards, asked that the defendant employer be restrained from employing, 
contrary to the agreement, workers who were not members of the Union. 
The injunction was refused: 
"The employment in question, so far from being unique and ex- 
traordinary, appears to be one of a very uniform and established 
character. The plaintiff, if it has any cause of action, will have an 
adequate remedy of law, just as would any other employee wrong- 
fully discharged. It will be possible for it to show the amount of 
services of the kind specified in the contract rendered to defendant 
by others than its members, and which its members might have 
rendered, and the consequent damages, if any.''12 
Not only did the court fail to see that the test to be applied is the unique- 
ness of the employer rather than the uniqueness of the kind of work 
done by the plaintiff's members-though, in this respect, the decision 
would probably not have been any different-but it also misconceived the 
extent and purpose of the collective bargain. It talked as though a union 
sold labor over the counter. It forgot that to require the union to forego 
suit until the term of the agreement had run out would mean breaking 
down the industrial standards established by the bargain and that suits 
week by week or month by month, even if they escaped condemnation 
on other scores, would be a practical impossibility. It failed to realize 
that the union in its collective capacity had an interest in the agreement 
apart from the particular wages that its members might collect.'3 And 
it assumed wrongly that an orderly distribution of the proceeds of a 
damage suit could be made by the union to its members,14 disregarding, 
so far as appears here, any possibility that while the defendant may have 
10. 38 Misc. 513, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit 
Judge, 217 Mich. 384, 186 N. W. 522, Schwartz v. Cigar Makers International Union, 
219 Mich. 589, 189 N. W. 55 (1922). For a summary and extensive quotations from the 
lower court's excellent opinion in the Michigan cases see 4 LAW AND LABOR 216 (1922). 
Cf. Adelman v. Universal Fur Dressing Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 511, 513, 174 Atl. 523, 524 
(1934), denying similar relief on a preliminary hearing because the injunction would 
require defendant to discharge its present workers when it is not clear that plaintiff's 
allegations are correct. 
11. 1 DeG. M. & G. 604 (Ch. App. 1852). 
12. 38 Misc. 513, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (Sup. Ct., 1902). 
13. See Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 633, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311, 314 (1st 
Dep't 1928); Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 24 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 193, 
198, 199 (1922). 
14. See Harper v. Local Union No. 120, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033, 1042 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ("no criterion of practical 
application for ascertaining the damages that would flow from breach of the collective 
agreement"). 
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had only 50 jobs to give out the union may have had 100 unemployed 
members. 
So far as New York is concerned, at any rate, this case has completely 
gone by the boards since the decision in Schlesinger v. Quinto."5 By a 
fortunate mischance the appellate court allowed this case to appear to be 
broader than it was in fact and opened the way for the lower New York 
courts and for the courts of other states to misconceive its scope. In the 
lower court-before Mr. Justice, now Senator, Wagner-it was treated 
not as a suit to enjoin breach of a collective agreement but as a suit to 
enjoin the defendants from forcing others to break the agreement.'6 Its 
background was a trade agreement entered into between the International 
Ladies Garment Workers Union on the one side and an employers' asso- 
ciation on the other. Originally made in 1919, it was modified in 1921 
after a dispute over wages and other conditions of work and the appoint- 
ment of a gubernatorial commission. While the union and the associa- 
tion were conferring on further possible changes to be made in the agree- 
ment, the association resolved to change from a week-work to a piece- 
work basis of production, to reduce wages and to increase hours. It 
resolved, moreover, that these changes should be made during the term 
of the agreement. An attempt to put them in force was met by a strike 
and by this action. The judgment of the lower court granting the in- 
junction requested was affirmed by a divided Appellate Division. To the 
defendant's contention that such an injunction amounted to an order of 
specific performance of a contract for personal services, the court replied 
that it was not a contract for personal services at all but rather an agree- 
ment between two organizations,17 each of which had disciplinary power 
over its members, and that the decree required only that that disciplinary 
authority be exercised.'8 
Not only has Schlesinger v. Quinto let loose a comparative flood of in- 
junctions in the lower New York courts19 against simple breaches of col- 
15. 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1922). 
16. Nothing in the decree of the lower court indicates that this is a suit to enjoin 
breach of contract. 117 Misc. 735, 748, 192 N. Y. Supp. 564, 570 (Sup. Ct., 1922). 
17. But notice the way in which the agreement is broken down in the lower court 
to get it to fit the handiest formula. It is treated as a series of agreements between the 
individual members of the employers' association on the one side and the union on the 
other. Thus there can be conspiracy by a group of persons and inducement by a third 
person-the association-to breach the agreement. 
18. "The defendants were not required to do anything that they had not agreed to 
do, nor were they prohibited from doing anything that they had a right to do under 
the contract." This, of course, is an argument that might be made to justify injunction 
against breach of any contract. 
19. Without attempting to be exhaustive, there have been found at least fifteen suc- 
cessful suits by unions for specific performance or injunction against breach in the lower 
New York courts from 1928 to 1938. Most of them have come during the last few 
years. A few particularly deserve a place in any documentary history of American 
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lective agreements by employers, but it has also had considerable influence 
outside of that State. In California,20 Georgia,21 Massachusetts,22 Mis- 
sissippi,23 New Jersey,24 Ohio25 and Texas,26 such injunctions have been 
issued27 with frequent citations of Schlesinger v. Quinto. Only in Iowa,28 
labor. One of these is Farulla v. Freundlich, 152 Misc. 761, 274 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. 
Ct. 1934), 153 Misc. 738, 277 N. Y. Supp. 47 (Sup. Ct. 1934), 155 Misc. 262, 279 N. Y. 
Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1935), Matter of Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 802 (1937) 
(a successive stage of the fight); Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807 
(Sup. Ct. 1924) (unsuccessful suit by an employer to set aside a bargain made with a 
union, noteworthy for its picture of the bargaining process in action). Enforcement 
in equity has been refused in a few cases. Burickson v. Kleen Laundry Service, 242 App. 
Div. 701, 272 N. Y. Supp. 866 (2d Dep't 1934); Morrin v. Structural Steel Board of 
Trade, Inc., 231 App. Div. 673, 248 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1st Dep't 1931) (preliminary re- 
lief refused because existence of agreement disputed) ; De Agostino v. Odeon-Roosevelt 
Corp., 93 N. Y. L. J. 2523 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1935) (relief denied on ground state 
anti-injunction law forbids injunction before hearing). 
20. Weber v. Nasser, 286 Pac. 1074 (Cal. App. 1930), appeal dismissed, (question 
moot) 210 Cal. 607, 292 Pac. 637 (1930). In view of this, the most that can be said 
is that the intermediate appellate court's opinion indicates which way the wind is blow- 
ing. 
21. O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 195 S. E. 564 (Ga. 1938) (representative suit by 
employees to enjoin violation of collective agreement held not subject to general demurr- 
er). 
22. Pearlman v. Millman, 7 LAW AND LABOR 286 (Super. Ct. Suffolk Co., Mass. 
1925); Henry v. Century Shoe Co., 12 LAW AND LABOR 7 (Super. Ct. Essex Co., Mass. 
1930). But cf. Ryan v. Tuttle-Jones Co., 3 LAW AND LABOR 139 (Super. Ct. Essex Co., 
Mass. 1921); Goyette v. Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 579-0, 581-3, 587-90, 140 N. E. 
285, 286, 287, 288-290 (1923) (enforcement refused either because agreement no longer 
in existence or, if in existence, because plaintiff union admitted it could not furnish 
enough men to do the work). 
23. Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union, No. 615, 174 Miss. 439, 
164 So. 887 (1936). 
24. Hudson Bus Transportation Drivers' Association v. Hill Bus Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 
582, 191 Atl. 763 (1937) (affirmed injunction ordering defendant bus company to employ 
only union members per agreement). Cf. Adelman v. Universal Fur Dressing Co., 116 
N. J. Eq. 511, 174 Atl. 523 (1924). 
25. Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 24 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 193 (1922); 
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 2 L. R. R. 837 
(C. P., 1938). In the earlier of these cases there was a charge, which obviously impressed 
the court, that the defendant employers "conspired" to break their agreements-i.e., that 
they concertedly did so. Sum v. Independent Retail Fruit Merchants' Association, 144 
Misc. 684, 258 N. Y. Supp. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1932), indicates that a similar charge was equal- 
ly effective in New York. Compare with Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. 
Switchmen's Union, 158 Fed. 541, 543 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1907), note 48 infra, on 
"conspiracy" among union members to break the union's side of a bargain. 
26. Harper v. Local 520, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 485 S. W. 
(2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). 
27. See also, e.g., Wetzel v. Clise, 148 Wash. 75, 268 Pac. 161 (1928) (union granted 
injunction against continued use of union label contra employer's agreement to give it up 
after termination of bargain). 
28. Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 753 (1933). 
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Michigan29 and West Virginia8 has an opposite result been reached by 
the courts.81 The objections raised to enforcement in equity have become 
pretty well standardized. The Iowa case serves as a good illustration. 
Lack of consideration to support the agreement, absence of mutuality and 
equity's timidity in dealing with personal service contracts are those which 
were found compelling in this case.82 Though the court could have planted 
itself squarely and solely on lack of consideration as its reason for refus- 
ing enforcement,33 it chose also to throw in some ambiguous words on 
mutuality and, although the suit was merely to compel the defendant to 
pay the wages set out in the agreement, devoted a paragraph to the per- 
sonal service rule. 
29. Cases in 4 LAW AND LABOR 216 (1922), cited supra note 10. But cf. Meeker v. 
Ellis, 6 LAW AND LABOR 249 (Mich. Cir. Ct., 1924). 
30. Berkhammer v. The Cleveland & Morgantown Coal Co., 8 LAW AND LABOR 217 
(W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1926). 
31. The statement applies only to cases in which the "essential validity" of the agree- 
ment or the appropriateness of the remedy asked for have been under discussion. It 
does not apply to cases in which relief has been refused because of illegality in the agree- 
ment or because of the application of the clean hands rule. On these matters see notes 
52 ff., 57 ff. infra. Nor does it apply to such a case as Bulkin v. Sacks, 31 D. & C. 501 
(Pa. C. P. 1938) in which such a suit has been held to fall within a local anti-injunc- 
tion statute, thus barring relief until the union had attempted extra-judicial remedies first. 
32. These and similar defenses have been used in suits brought by an individual on 
the collective agreements, e.g., (1) There is an adequate remedy at law, hence equitable 
relief is not available: Mosshamer v. Wabash Railway Co., 221 Mich. 407, 411, 191 N. W. 
210, 211 (1922) (seniority). Contra: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 
43 Ariz. 379, 401, 31 P. (2d) 971, 978 (1931). (2) The personal service rule prevents 
recovery in equity: Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss. 613, 91 So. 346 (1922) (employer 
merely a formal party). Contra: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, supra 
at 405, 31 P. (2d) 979. (3) The contract of employment is "unilateral" or "lacking in 
mutuality," (i.e., in many cases, "without consideration"): St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
So. Ry. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 406, 42 S. W. 902, 904 (1897) (wrongful discharge); 
St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Ry. v.- Booker, 5 S. W. (2d) 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1929), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 852 (1929). Contra: McGlohn v. Gulf & S. I. R. R., 179 
Miss. 396, 403, 174 So. 250, 253 (1937). (4) Another remedy is provided in the agree- 
ment which plaintiff has failed to pursue or which, having been pursued, forecloses judi- 
cial action: Reed v. St. Louis Southwestern R. R., 95 S. W. (2d) 887, 888 (Mo. 
App. 1936) (wrongful discharge). Contra: Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 
126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934). (5) Miscellaneous objections: Elmore v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. R., 191 N. C. 182, 131 S. E. 633 (1926) (wrong form of action, tort, 
chosen); St. Clair v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 76 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) 
(delay in hearing caused by employee precludes him from claiming wages for wrongful 
discharge). 
See note 130, infra. On the general subject of seniority rights, see Christenson, Se- 
niority Riphts Under Labor Union Working Agreements, (1937) 11 TEMPLE L. Q. 355; 
Comment, Seniority Rights in Labor Relations (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 73. 
33. The text of the agreement read: 
"AGREEMENT, AUG. 18, 1931. 
"It is agreed between District No. 13, U. M. W. of A., and the 
Airline Coal Company of Ottumwa, Iowa, that the above Coal com- 
pany shall pay the wage scale as specified and operate under the terms 
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Granting that the objection to enforcing the agreement for lack of 
consideration was well taken in the Iowa case, what of the other objec- 
tions? The requirement that there be mutuality of remedy as well as 
mutuality of obligation as a condition precedent to equitable relief has 
been so fully and completely criticized that it needs little comment here.34 
Professor Simpson has seen in these collective bargaining cases a tendency 
to reject the rule.35 This is a permissible interpretation, particularly in 
jurisdictions where the rule has been weakened in other types of cases. 
It is equally possible, however, that these cases will be used in the future 
as a justification for giving an employer equitable relief against a default- 
ing union where such relief would not now be given.36 
The rule against compelling specific performance of an agreement for 
personal services is at first glance rather more embarrassing. It has dis- 
solved easily, however, in the hands of courts friendly towards collective 
agreements. They have got around it by taking a sensible distinction 
between an agreement to hire a particular person or persons and an agree- 
ment to hire unspecified persons from a specified group. In effect they 
have enunciated a "lump of labor" doctrine, saying, for instance, that 
"it is the service of a mass of employees" that is involved and that "if 
one [employee] is unsuitable and incompetent, then the union is prepared 
to furnish another who is satisfactory."37 
The outcome would presumably be different if there were an agree- 
ment by the employer to take those particular employees which were fur- 
and conditions of the Des Moines agreement which expires April 1, 
1933. Frank Wilson, President, U. M. W. of A. Airline Coal Co., 
by J. H. Genochio." 
The consideration question has not been strongly urged in many cases and the objec- 
tion to lack of consideration can be easily obviated by most unions-e.g., granting the use 
of the union label, promising not to strike, agreeing to furnish workers to the extent of 
the union's available membership. See Farulla v. Freundlich, 155 Misc. 262, 265, 279 
N. Y. Supp. 228, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (calling off strike). Apart from the reluctance 
of courts to grant equitable relief against breach of an agreement under seal and the 
added difficulties which would attend suit on such a contract by members of the union 
individually, there is no reason why, in jurisdictions in which seal retains its former effi- 
cacy, it should not be used. See, e.g., Barzilay v. Lowenthal, 134 App. Div. 502, 119 
N. Y. Supp. 612 (1st Dep't 1904). Similarly as to agreements made in conformity with 
the Uniform Written Obligations Act, in force in Pennsylvania. 
34. WALSH, EQUITY (1930) c. 14; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS ? 372; Cook, The 
Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 897; Durfee, 
Mutuality in Specific Performance (1922) 20 MICH. L. REV. 289; Stone, The "Mutuality" 
Rule in New York (1916) 16 CoL L. REV. 443. But cf. HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 
(2d ed. 1937) 531. 
35. Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 201. 
36. See Harper v. Local Union No. 120, 485 S. W. (2d) 1033, 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1932); see Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 730, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807, 820 (Sup. Ct. 
1924). 
37. Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union, 174 Miss. 439, 448, 164 
So. 887, 890 (1936). 
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nished and selected by the union.38 A decree of specific performance of 
such an agreement would be a considerable modification of the personal 
service rule as it is usually stated. Yet such in effect has been the result 
reached by the Mississippi Supreme Court39 and such in effect is the 
result of the enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act when the 
Board orders employers to take back men discharged for union activities. 
The orders of the Board ignore a doctrine that would otherwise thwart 
the purpose of the Act. Under them the employer is required to accept 
specific performance of services in order effectively to preserve the em- 
ployees' right to choose their union affiliations and to bargain collectively. 
It may be that experience under the Act will lead equity to reconsider its 
own rule. For the presumption lying behind the rule is that the defendant 
will require more supervision than a court of equity can give him, that 
he will be an unwilling and recalcitrant employer or employee. To the 
extent that this is the rationale, continued refusal to grant specific per- 
formance of personal service contracts against an employer is another 
instance of the imperfect adjustment of legal doctrine to an industrial 
society. Though technological change and the growth of the corporate 
employer do not make the employee work in any less personal sense than 
he used to, they do warrant inquiry into the weight to be given to the 
"unwillingness" of the modern corporate employer and they necessitate 
shifting one's eyes from the corporation to the employee's immediate 
associates and superiors. It is here that experience under the National 
Labor Relations Act will be very helpful in assessing the worth of the 
equity rule. If, in fact, the Board's requiring the employer to rehire a 
man does not disrupt the plant-if, in fact, though the corporate employer 
is unwilling, the employee's more immediate associates do not refuse to 
get along with him-the argument in favor of the modification will be 
impressive. This does not mean, of course, that specific performance will 
be ordered in every case in which a contract of employment has been 
broken. Rather the problem for equity will become one of the adequacy 
of the remedy at law-granting that the adequacy rule itself remains in- 
tact. In the case of an individual or a small group, damages may often 
be an adequate remedy where in the case of a closed shop provision in 
a collective agreement sued on by the union they would be inadequate. 
These cases in which equitable relief has been refused to the union 
suggest another problem of some importance, viz., the measure of damages 
when an action at law is brought by the union-a subject hardly yet 
touched by the courts.40 Punitive damages, it may be taken for granted, 
38. Cf. Chinese American Restaurant v. Finegan, 272 Mass. 360, 172 N. E. 510 
(1930) (no injunction against union's interference with previous contract whereby col- 
lective agreement union was to supply stipulated number of musicians). 
39. See note 23, supra. 
40. See Stone Cleaning & Pointing Union v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 77 N. Y. Supp. 
1049 (Sup. Ct. 1902). The presumption in most cases is, apparently, that the union is 
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are out of the question. Compensatory damages, as the term is ordinarily 
used, may well lead to highly undesirable results if used as a measure 
of maximum recovery. What is needed in addition is a measure that will 
as effectively fulfill the purposes of the collective bargain as the com- 
pensatory standard fulfills the purposes of commercial contracts. If, as 
has been argued, the agreement is intended, in any case, to prevent the 
employer from profiting by competition among workers at a level below 
that set by the bargain and further, in many cases, to prevent inter-em- 
ployer competition at the expense of labor standards rather than by in- 
creasing efficiency and reducing other costs, the minimum standard will 
have to be what may be called a "fulfillment" or "maintenance" standard 
rather than a compensatory or a punitive standard. So stated, the general 
rule could be formulated thus: A plaintiff union is entitled to damages at 
least to the extent that the employer has profited by his breach of the 
collective agreement and, in addition, to any special damages which it 
can. show and which are left uncompensated by the recovery under the 
first part of the rule. Thus, in the case of a breach of the wages provision 
of the agreement, if suit is not or cannot be maintained by or on behalf 
of the individualemployees,4' the union should be entitled to collect at 
least the difference between the wages paid and those called for by the 
terms of the agreement-the amount, that is, that the individual workers 
could collect if they sued for themselves and that will act as an effective 
deterrent to further attempts at wage-cutting, not merely the amount 
which a jury can be convinced (by what must almost necessarily be un- 
satisfactory evidence) the union has suffered in its collective capacity. If, 
over and above this, it can show any special damages, these ought also 
to be awarded. So, too, damages for breach of a closed shop provision 
ought to be measured by the employer's gain from the breach and, to the 
extent that these have not already been taken care of, by the losses to 
the union and to its members from their inability to find work. 
Even if this is the rule that ought to apply where a union is suing on 
the collective bargain, it does not follow that the ordinary measure of 
damages should be replaced in the case of a breach by the union with 
doing something equivalent to selling services over the counter and that the ordinary 
rules apply. Cf. Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 633, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311, 314 
(lst Dep't 1928). As to suits brought by a union on behalf of its individual members 
whose employer has not lived up to the terms of the agreement, see Barth v. Addie Co., 
271 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. (2d) 34 (1936). 
41. For discussion of possible difficulties in the individual employee's maintaining his 
suit on the agreement, see infra 225 ff. In some cases the individual will be unwilling, 
even if able, to sue. That the union, in its collective capacity, will have sustained dam- 
ages nonetheless is clear without further statement. The rule suggested in the text, 
regarding, for instance, the wage scale, will yield the same result as if suits were brought 
by individual employees for breach of the agreement as to them and by the union for 
breach as to it. 
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a consequent suit by the employer.42 In a Federal district court case43 
damages were awarded to a plaintiff employer against incorporated union 
defendants. The men had refused to work unless they were paid higher 
wages than those provided for in the collective agreement which also 
called for preferential hiring of union members so long as they were 
available. Though the union officers tried to get the men back to work, 
they refused to go until they had been ordered to do so by a general 
meeting of the union. Arguing that the agreement lacked consideration 
because the plaintiff was not bound to send ships to New Orleans to be 
unloaded and so to give work to the men, and that, in any event, it did 
not require them to furnish men but merely fixed wages, hours and the 
conditions to be observed if they did work, the unions sought to escape 
liability. The court passed by the first of these objections in silence, ad- 
mitted that there was no obligation in terms in the agreement for the 
men to work, but awarded damages on the ground that such was the 
reasonable import of the bargain. The plaintiff asked that the demurrage 
for the delay be taken as the measure of damages; the court held that 
"recovery should be confined to what it would have cost for additional 
wages to unload the ship at the rate demanded,"-in other words, the 
unavoidable loss-caused to the employer by the strike. Whatever the rule 
to be applied when the union is plaintiff, this seems to be a reasonable 
result if the measure of damages is itself to serve the purpose for which, 
presumably, the agreement is made. On the employer's part, the making 
of such an agreement-so far as it is purposive at all-is usually for the 
purpose of getting men to work for him at a scale of wages previously 
agreed on."4 Their refusal to work will result in a loss to him which 
is measurable by his loss of business or by the additional cost of con- 
ducting his business during the forbidden strike. There is no necessity. 
in such a situation, for a departure from the normally applicable rules 
of compensatory damages. 
Likewise, the general desirability of granting equitable relief at the 
suit of the union does not require that similar relief be granted in the 
case of a suit by the employer. Damages are more likely to be an adequate 
42. No implication is intended in the next few paragraphs that the only possible 
breach by a union lies in a forbidden strike or in a refusal to arbitrate; these are, how- 
ever, the only sorts of breach that have come before the courts. Cf. Powers v. Journey- 
man Bricklayers Union, No. 3, 130 Tenn. 643, 172 S. W. 284 (1914). 
43. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij [alias Holland-American 
Line] v. Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benevolent Society, 265 Fed. 397 (E. D. La. 
1920). For other cases involving actions for damages for breach of contract, see Honor 
& Co. v. New Orleans Longshoremen's Union, reported by Rice in (1931) 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 572, 602 n. 118 (ct. unnamed, 1909); Busch Jewelry Co. v. Optical Workers Union, 
2 L. R. R. 633 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). 
44. See Meltzer v. Kaminer, 131 Misc. 813, 814, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 
1927). 
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remedy in the latter case than they would be in the former. And the 
personal service rule, so far as it is brought into play, retains consider- 
ably more vitality and sense here than it does in the employer-defendant 
case. For employees still work, and specific performance would compel 
them to work, in a very personal sense. Their unwillingness to be em- 
ployed is much more likely to have the consequences that the orthodox 
personal service rule anticipates than is the unwillingness of the employer 
to employ them. Such considerations as these ought to be of greater 
influence in determining the law to be applied than the beauty of any 
artificial symmetry. 
.So far as the law of the cases goes there is, as might be expected, little 
uniformity of treatment. The few cases that we have dealing with the 
enforceability of a promise to arbitrate agree that an order to do so will 
be issued at the employer's suit.45 But most of the cases are concerned 
with the propriety of granting equitable relief against a strike. Of these, 
some enjoin the strike itself,46 others dodge that issue by enjoining only 
45. Amsterdam & Co. v. Devery, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 427 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Matter 
of Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 99 N. Y. L. J. 2037 (Sup. Ct. 1938). But cf. 
Matter of Buffalo & Erie Ry., 250 N. Y. 275, 165 N. E. 291 (1929) ; Matter of Amster- 
dam Dispatch, 99 N. Y. L. J. 2593, 2 L. R. R. 524 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1938), holding 
the New York arbitration statute limited to interpretation of an existing agreement and 
not extending to dispute over future terms. Unions have also secured orders compelling 
employers to arbitrate. Meeker v. Ellis, 6 LAW AND LABOR 249 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1924); 
Matter of Amalgamated Association of Street & Electric Ry. Employees, 196 App. Div. 
206, 188 N. Y. Supp. 353 (3d Dep't 1921); Matter of Collective Bargaining Committee 
of Consumers Biscuit Co., 93 N. Y. L. J. 3352 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Matter of Marcus, 3 L. R. 
R. 21 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). And see Publishers' Association of New York City v. 
New York Typographical Union, 168 Misc. 267, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 847 (Sup. Ct. 1938) 
(modifying and confirming arbitration award possible to union). But compare Goldstein 
v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 Atl. 43 (1938) (the 
Pennsylvania statute does not permit arbitrators to give the equivalent of equitable re- 
lief, though such would be all right under common law arbitration); Polk v. The Cleve- 
land Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808 (1925), note 72, infra. 
46. Burgess v. Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry., 148 Ga. 415, 96 S. E. 864 (1918); 
Strassel Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Local 118, 7 LAW AND LABOR 118 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 
1925) semble; Lynn Shoe Manufacturers' Association v. United Shoe Workers of 
America, 1 (no. 1) LAW AND LABOR 7 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1918) semble; All-Metal 
Lighting Fixture Corp. v. Wilson, 10 LAW AND LABOR 243, 248 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1928) 
semble; Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania, 29 Luzerne Leg. 
Reg. 463 (Pa. C. P. 1935) (ordering defendants to call off a strike). In Greater City 
Master Plumbers Association v. Kahme, 98 N. Y. L. J. 954 (Sup. Ct. 1937), the court 
explained its injunction against striking for higher wages and shorter hours during the 
term of an agreement which provided a different method for settling disputes thus: 
"Neither can it be said that an injunction compels the men in the union to return to work. 
They individually may do so as they see fit. An injunction enjoins the union from call- 
ing or continuing a strike in violation of its contractual obligation and doing acts which 
might be legal were a strike actually in existence." 
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the preliminaries to the strike,47 and still others refuse equitable relief 
completely.48 
The cases so far discussed have all been simple suits to prevent or to 
recover damages for a breach of the collective agreement. Granting that 
any breach will give rise to a cause of action to remedy that breach, how 
serious must the breach be before the other party is entitled to repudiate 
the agreement? It has been suggested before that the collective agree- 
ment is in some ways comparable to a statute. If the agreement is between 
a single employer and a large group of employees, the obligations which 
it casts upon the employees take on a good deal of the flavor of duties 
imposed by a statute, particularly if there has been a dispute within the 
union ranks as to whether the agreement in question should or should 
not be accepted. If it is between an employers' association and a union, 
the same flavor extends to the employers' side as well. The greater the 
number of individuals bound by the contract, the more likely it is that 
a breach will occur; the more disparate the group of human beings it 
seeks to govern, the more likely there is to be an occasional revolt against 
it. As a tentative suggestion, then, it might be worth considering whether 
the problems arising from breach and enforcement of a collective bar- 
gain are not more readily comparable to those arising out of the breach 
47. Meltzer v. Kaminer, 131 Misc. 813, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Preble 
v. Architectural Iron Workers Union, Local No. 63, 260 Ill. App. 435 (1935); Barnes & 
Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (S. D. Ohio 1907), rev'd on a finding that no trade agreement 
existed, 157 Fed. 883 (S. D. Ohio 1908), aff'd, 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909). 
In all three cases it was emphasized that equity could not forbid the quitting of work 
individually or by concerted action, but that it could forbid officers from instigating or 
calling strikes or from taking strike votes. Probably many of the semble cases in the 
preceding note would, if the full decree were available, fall into this group. See also 
Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers, Buffers & Platers Local Union No. 44, 113 Atl. 320, 1 
(no. 6) LAW AND LABOR 12 (N. J. Ch. 1919) (inferable that the injunction against the 
union officers is bottomed on a threatened breach of contract); Newell v. Electrical Busi- 
ness Association, 11 LAW AND LABOR 209 (Ohio C. P. 1928). 
48. Foss v. Portland Terminal Co., 287 Fed. 33 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923) (though threat- 
ened strike would be violation of collective agreement embodying provisions of the Trans- 
portation Act of 1920 for settlement of differences between parties, equitable relief against 
defendant officers' calling strike pursuant to already-taken vote of men held forbidden by 
Clayton Act, in absence of showing that strike would be other than peaceful); Delaware, 
Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Switchmen's Union, 158 Fed. 541 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 
1907) (injunction denied against officers' advising their members on a strike in violation 
of collective agreement, where strike had already been voted on by membership and 
needed only president's sanction to go into effect); Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 252 App. 
Div. 890, 300 N. Y. Supp. 64 (2d Dep't 1937) (injunctive enforcement of alleged agree- 
ment not to strike against public policy as declared by Legislature); Lundoff-Bicknell 
Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N. E. 243 (1927) (mandatory decree ordering of- 
ficers of union to discipline union members who struck in violation of collective agree- 
ment denied on ground that court could not enjoin strike directly and ought not to do so 
in this roundabout fashion). Cf. Barzilay v. Loewenthal, 134 App. Div. 502, 119 N. Y. 
Supp. (1st Dep't 1904). 
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and enforcement of a statute than to the same problems in the case of 
ordinary commercial contracts-whether, in other words, there is justifi- 
cation for permitting the aggrieved party to consider the bargain off no 
matter how trivial the breach. Certainly it is within the reasonable ex- 
pectation of the parties to a trade agreement that not every employer 
and not every group of union members will, regardless of local conditions, 
changes in prices and the cost of living, and simple misunderstanding of 
the terms of the agreement, abide by it strictly at all times. Though the 
matter has not been discussed in the cases,49 the rules covering breach 
are probably sufficiently elastic to adjust themselves easily to this situa- 
tion.50 
A second question that arises is this: Admitting that there has been 
a breach, how great-how serious-a breach is required before either 
party may resort to self-help? Must the aggrieved side first come to 
court, or may it take enforcement into its own hands from the outset? 
In the case of a commercial contract there is not much difficulty with 
the problem. Where self-help is resorted to, it is generally of a negative 
variety, a simple refusal to deal with the other party any longer. Except 
in those comparatively rare instances in which employers are working 
their plants at top capacity and the union has a virtual monopoly of the 
supply of highly skilled and essential labor, this is not an available method 
of forcing compliance with the provisions of a collective bargain. 
From the union's point of view at least, a good deal of the practical 
answer to be given to the question ought to depend on the speed with 
which the courts function. Granting, for the sake of the argument, that 
it is more desirable for such disputes to be settled in court than on the 
picket line, no union can well be expected to rely solely on litigation if 
there is a long delay in redress while its members are out of work or 
wages are being cut and while competing employers are being tempted 
to follow the leader. 
The cases on this question are rather few and contradictory.51 More fre- 
quently they take another form which provides us with a third question: 
49. See Zaritsky v. Lish, 95 N. Y. L. J. 346 (Sup. Ct. 1936) in which the defendant 
employers' association elected to repudiate the agreement after an unauthorized strike 
and plaintiff-union's refusal to put the men back to work immediately. Stronger is Davis 
v. Bonn, 16 Misc. 19, 37 N.Y. Supp. 688 (App.Term 1896), suit on a bond given by an 
employer to guarantee performance of a closed shop agreement. Defendant discharged 
a man and the union struck. He then hired non-union men. Held: Plaintiffs' was the 
first breach; nothing in the agreement forbade defendant to discharge; plaintiffs were 
bound by the bargain to furnish what help he needed. For the other side of the picture, 
also without discussion, see Burgess v. Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co., 148 
Ga. 415, 96 S. E. 864 (1918). 
50. See ANSON, CONTRAcr (Corbin's 5th Am. ed. 1931) 475; RESTATEMENT, CON- 
TRAcrIs (1932) ?? 274, 275. 
51. Jensen v. St. Paul Moving Picture Machine Operators Local Union No. 356, 
194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811 (1935) (at most, defendants had a cause of action for 
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The collective bargain having been broken in some way by one party, 
is that party deprived of the benefit of equitable relief against otherwise 
forbidden acts by the other party? This, it will be recognized, is nothing 
but the clean hands doctrine stated in question form. It is doubtful 
whether there is an answer to the problem even for a single jurisdiction, 
let alone for all jurisdictions. The facts of such cases as we have may be 
enough to account for an apparent difference of opinion between, for 
instance, the Wisconsin and the Massachusetts courts. But taking ap- 
pearances at face value, one would say that the Wisconsin court adheres 
to the view that breach of a collective agreement by the employer so soils 
his hands that equity will give him no help,52 and that the Massachusetts 
court adheres to a contrary view.53 Oregon apparently agrees with Massa- 
chusetts54 and the lower New York courts divide on the subject.55 
The opposite side of the picture is represented by the question of 
whether breach of the agreement restricts the tactics which the guilty 
damages for prior breach of the contract; such cause of action was not a labor dispute 
within the terms of the State anti-injunction statute; injunction granted against picket- 
ing plaintiff's theater; clean hands doctrine apparently not raised as a defense) ; Maisel 
v. Sigman, 123 Miss. 714, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1924); compare Nasser v. 
Musicians' Union of San Francisco County, 12 LAW AND LABOR 204 (Super. Ct. San 
Francisco Co., Cal. 1930) with Bonwit v. Schlesinger, 4 LAW AND LABOR 130 (unnamed 
ct., N. Y. 1922). 
52. David Adler & Sons Co. v. Maglio, 200 Wis. 153, 228 N. W. 123 (1929). 
53. Samuel Hertzig Corp. v. Gibbs, 3 N. E. (2d) 831 (1936); Phelps Publishing 
Co. v. Frazer, 3 LAW AND LABOR 124 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1921); Ryan v. Tuttle-Jones Co., 
3 LAW AND LABOR 139 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1921). Not to be confused with this situation 
are Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82 (1927); Service 
Wood Heel Co. v. Mackesy, 199 N. E. 400 (Mass. 1936) (cases where the union had 
a contract with the third party purchaser as to use of only union products; union 
enjoined from interfering with prior contract between the plaintiff and the third party). 
On the question of the chronological sequence of the two contracts, compare Chinese- 
American Restaurant v. Finegan, 272 Mass. 360, 172 N. E. 510 (1930). There is no 
indication that the court considers the defendants' actions malicious inducements to 
breach a prior contract, although "malice" seems necessary to an employer's liability 
for inducing an employee to break an agreement with his union not to enter into any 
individual employment arrangements. New England Wood Heel *Co. v. Nolan, 268 
Mass. 191, 167 N. E. 323 (1929); Nolan v. Farmington Shoe Manufacturing Co., 25 F. 
(2d) 906 (D. Mass. 1928). Nor does the court adopt the rule of the Restatement of 
Contracts, ? 576, that a later contract knowingly made in derogation of an earlier one 
is void. 
54. Greenfield v. Central Labor Council, 104 Ore. 236, 192 Pac. 783 (1920), 207 
Pac. 168 (1922). 
55. It is impossible, of course, to say how much weight the fact of plaintiff's breach 
carried with the court. Taking the cases at face value, they divide thus: (1) pro- 
Wisconsin: Yahrbloom v. Freedman, 3 LAW AND LABOR 278 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1921); 
Bonwit v. Schlesinger, 4 LAW AND LABOR 130 (unnamed ct., N. Y. 1922); Segenfeld & 
Kalin v. Schlesinger, 117 Misc. 731, 193 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1922); (2) pro- 
Massachusetts: Greenberg v. Berlin, 4 LAW AND LABOR 309 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1922); 
Bolivian Panama Hat Co., Inc. v. Finkelstein, 127 Misc. 337, 215 N. Y. Supp. 399 (Sup. 
Ct. 1925). 
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party may thereafter employ. Again the cases are few and mean little 
unless one knows what rules of law would have been applied in the ab- 
sence of a breach. It may be that breach was merely thrown in, in some 
of the cases, as a make-weight and that the relief would have been forth- 
coming even if there had been no agreement to be broken in the first 
place. But such cases as we have indicate that breach by the union will 
be taken by the court as a reason for giving relief to the employer which 
he might not otherwise get.56 
Illegality as a problem in the collective bargain chiefly centers around 
the validity of the closed shop agreement. In spite of all the discussion 
we have had by the courts and in legal literature generally, it cannot be 
said that the enforceability or unenforceability of such a provision is well 
settled in more than one or two jurisdictions. The professed doctrine of 
practically all of the decisions,57 however, has been reasonably consistent 
with the position of the New York Court of Appeals in Jacobs v. Cohen:58 
"It would seem as though an employer should be, unquestionably, 
free to enter into such a contract with his workmen for the conduct 
of his business, without its being deemed obnoxious upon any ground 
56. Phelps Publishing Co. v. Ringler, 3 LAW AND LABOR 124 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 
1921); Sunshine Theatre Corp. v. Ringler, 3 LAW AND LABOR 260 (Unnamed Ct. N. Y. 
1921); Beckerman v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union, 28 Ohio 
N. P. (N.S.) 550 (1931); Weiss v. International Bakery & Confectionery Workers of 
America, 13 LAW AND LABOR 136 (Ohio C. P. 1931). 
57. Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Association of Street & Electric 
Ry. Employees, Division 441, 204 Iowa 1195, 1206, 213 N. W. 264 (1927); Bandler v. 
Lorberbaum, 91 N. Y. L. J. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Farulla v. Freundlich, 152 Misc. 761, 
274 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N. Y. Supp. 
807 (Sup. Ct. 1924); DeAgostina v. Parkshire Ridge Amusements, 155 Misc. 518, 278 
N. Y. Supp. 622 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Polk v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 
N. E. 808 (1925); Harper v. Local Union 520, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS, 
? 515, illustrations 18 and 19. Compare the test in Upholsterers, Carpet & Linoleum 
Mechanics International Union, Local No. 76 v. Essex Reed & Fibre Co., 12 N. J. 
Misc. 637, 174 Atl. 207 (Ch. 1935) (" . . . the present contract is but part and 
parcel of an attempt to unionize the whole industry in the metropolitan area and to 
create a monopoly of labor in that industry. Such a contract is opposed to public policy 
and is void"). 
The virtual unanimity with which the courts test legality vel non by the possible 
effect on a non-union employee in these cases makes it unnecessary to do more than 
suggest that there might be other tests-e.g., the effect on the public at large or the 
effect on employers. The former finds an echo in Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 37, 
46 N. E. 297, 298-299 (1897). For a suggestion of the latter see Folsom Engraving 
Co. v. McNeil, 126 N. E. 479, 480, 235 Mass. 269, 278 (1920). 
58. Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905). The case was decided by 
a divided court after the unanimous opinion in Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 
297 (1897) had been cleared away by a still more divided court in National Prot. Ass'n 
v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902). See note 66, infra. 
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of public policy. If it might operate to prevent some persons from 
being employed by the firm, or possibly, from remaining in the firm's 
employment, this is but an incidental feature. Its restrictions were 
not of an oppressive nature, operating generally in the community 
to prevent such craftsmen from obtaining employment and from earn- 
ing their livelihood . . . To coerce workmen to become members of 
the employes' organization through such a contract, is not the allega- 
tion of something which the law will, necessarily, regard as contra- 
vening public policy." 
The stated rule in this type of case being what it is, one might expect 
to find a reflection of it in those instances in which an individual non- 
member of the union sues because he has been deprived of his job or 
because he cannot find one. The case would be even stronger if it were 
a rival union that is suing. One would expect that the individual or the 
rival union would have a strong cause of action if it could be shown 
that employment opportunity had been substantially59 lessened by the 
enforcement of the closed shop rules. A showing that employment oppor- 
tunity had not been substantially lessened would probably be a good 
defense. Except in Connecticut,60 however, this test has not been recog- 
nized.6' Reading the cases on their facts, the line of cleavage nearly 
everywhere else appears to be between those in which the non-union 
plaintiff has lost a job he already had because of a closed shop contract62 
59. I say "substantially" for want of a better term. Between the zero-restraint when 
no closed shop agreements are in force and the total-restraint when all employers are 
bound by such agreements-the only two points on the scale that can be definitely 
located-there is much room for play. An otherwise indefinite term could be made 
more satisfactory if the court would base its decision on the equality or inequality of 
the proportion of jobs available to non-union men to the proportion of qualified workers 
who are non-members. This, of course, would in many cases necessitate a nice inquiry 
into qualifications for the job. It would also-as do the present cases-require the court 
to define the area which it considers important. On the latter point, see Local Union 
No. 65, Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' International Alliance v. Nalty, 7 F. (2d) 
100 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609, 48 N. Y. Supp. 77 (App. 
Term 1897) indicating, in comparable cases, that it is determined by the distance men 
ordinarily go from their homes to find work. 
60. Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913). 
61. Cf. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 
720 (Ch. 1938). See note 85, infra. 
62. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905); Fairbanks v. McDonald, 
219 Mass. 291, 106 N. E. 1000 (1914) (damages and injunction against carrying out 
closed shop agreement; when plaintiffs applied to defendant union, membership fee 
raised to punish them for persistence in remaining members of rival union); Shinsky 
v. Tracey, 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 956 (1917) (only damages awarded to plaintiff, 
expelled from union which controls 90% of the jobs in the city); Lucke v. Clothing 
Cutters' and Trimmers' Assembly, No. 7507, 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505 (1893) (the court 
intimates strongly that an agreement by plaintiff's employer to run closed shop is no 
justification for defendant's having plaintiff, a non-union man fired, even though many 
of its own members are out of work; also stressed is defendant's unwillingness to 
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and those in which he is merely seeking employment which he cannot 
find because of a similar agreement." In the' former, he has been per- 
mitted to recover; in the latter, he has not. 
In contrast with these cases stands the recent decision of the New York 
Court of Appeals in Williams v. Quill.64 If its result varies from those 
reached in other jurisdictions, it also differs-as the other cases them- 
selves differ-from the result that would be expected to flow from an 
acceptance of the doctrine set out in, say, Jacobs v. Cohen. Attempting 
to make use of this doctrine, counsel for the plaintiffs in the Quill case 
conceded: 
"that this contract is valid . . . except . . . that, as the defendant 
employers constitute the main transit and railroad lines in the local- 
ity stated, there is by this contract a monopoly created; that is, if 
only union men are to be employed, the plaintiffs, if they refuse to 
join the union, will be without employment." 
But the argument was rejected by the court which said that: 
"this distinction [between a closed shop agreement that does and 
one that does not monopolize the employer market ( ?) ] is not justi- 
fied, and that if there be an evil in the monopoly of the labor market 
in a particular industry by labor organizations it is a matter to be 
considered by Legislatures and not by the courts, for the reason that 
there are two sides to the question-the other side being that the 
labor organizations, through this means of contracting and nego- 
tiating, are enabled to strengthen their representative bodies and to 
effectuate collective bargaining."65 
It is probably not too much to expect that Williams v. Quill will in time 
find its reflection in the direct enforcement cases. If so, it will be a 
repetition of New York's experience with technically distinguishable cases 
in the past.66 
admit him to membership). But. cf. Baker v. Amalgamated Association of Street & 
Electric Railway Employees, Division 268, 6 LAW AND LABOR 104 (Ohio C. P. 1924); 
Harmon v. United Mine Workers, 166 Ark. 255, 266 S. W. 84 (1924) (employment at 
will held decisive). 
63. Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. 717 (1914) (no allegation that 
jobs lost by operation of the closed shop agreement; injunction denied); Shinsky v. 
O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N. E. 790 (1919) (evidence that plaintiff applied for work 
at three factories and would have been given a job at any one of them except for the 
closed shop provision). Accord: Underwood v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 178 S. W. 
38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Reihing v. Local Union No. 52, International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers, 94 N. J. L. 240, 109 Atl. 367 (1920). 
64. Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938). 
65. Id., at 9, 551. 
66. The history of the New York court's attitude towards closed shop agreements 
should be a warning against taking too seriously any attempt to analyze the cases 
merely on their facts or on their procedural set-up in this field. Curran v. Galen, 152 
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Similarly, one might expect some weight to be given to the rule which 
is said to govern direct enforcement of a collective bargain when a court 
is called on to determine the liability of a union for harmful activities 
directed toward getting a closed shop agreement. One might expect to 
find picketing or other pressure methods condemned if a substantial part 
of a given industry, were already tied up with such agreements and one 
might expect to find them approved-unless the jurisdiction holds them 
to be bad. regardless of their object-if the industry were not already so 
tied up. But again, except for a rare instance in New Jersey,67 the cases 
do not break along this line.68 Whether the suit is brought by an individual 
employee or a rival union or by an employer, whether it is won or lost, 
such rationale as there is. in this type of case is phrased in terms of the 
"right" of the employer to run his plant open-shop if he so pleases or 
in terms of the "right" of the union members to refuse to work except 
under such conditions as they please.69 The rationale, to put it differently, 
is no more than a description of the result following from enforcement 
of the, decision and the attempted ratio decidendi could better be abbre- 
viated to an admitted fiat. 
These two types of cases, of course, are technically distinguishable from 
that in which we are primarily interested 70-the suit to enforce a closed 
shop agreement directly. While a court which is willing to sanction a 
strike or other collective activity for a closed shop is hardly likely to refuse 
to enforce the resulting agreement, it is quite possible that a court which 
N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897) (a suit for damages for procuring plaintiff's discharge 
from his job, with a closed shop agreement between his employer and defendant union 
interposed as a defense and rejected); National Protective Association v. Cummings, 
170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902) (threats to strike unless the plaintiffs discharged 
not enjoinable); Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905); Kissam v. United 
States Printing Co., 199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 
342, 117 N. E. 587 (1917). Compare Au-burn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 
124 N. E. 97 (1919) (Bossert case distinguished by finding boycotting combination's 
membership too wide). 
67. Four Plating Co. v. Mako, 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 194 Atl. 53 (1937). 
68. Compare the test-again not consistently adhered to-suggested in Folsom 
Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479 (1920). See note 57, supra. 
69. For two illustrations out of the many available, see Kemp v. Division No. 241, 
255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912) (suit by individual employees against the union; judg- 
ment for defendant); Alfred W. Booth & Brother v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 
226 (Ch. 1906) (suit by employer against union; judgment for plaintiff). 
70. Also to be distinguished are those cases in which suit is brought, generally 
under an anti-trust statute, against an employers' association and/or a union, the former 
agreeing to hire only union men, the latter to work only for association members. For 
examples, see National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Association, 169 Fed. 259 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1909); Belfi v. United States, 259 Fed. 822 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919); Brescia 
Construction Co. v. Stone Masons Contractors' Association, 195 App. Div. 647, 187 
N. Y. Supp. 77 (1st Dep't 1921); American Fur Manufacturers v. Associated Fur Coat 
& Trimming Manufacturers, 161 Misc. 246, 291 N. Y. Supp. 610 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 
251 App. Div. 708, 296 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (1st Dep't 1937). 
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will put every obstacle it can in the way of attaining a closed shop will 
nevertheless decline to stir up further trouble once it has been written 
into a collective agreement. This, we have it from the Massachusetts 
court, is the law of that state. 
The direct enforcement cases, however, raise other questions of im- 
portance. For instance, conceding arguendo the illegality of the closed 
shop provision in a particular agreement, what should be the attitude of 
the court when some other portion of the agreement is brought into 
question in the courts? The answer that will be given in practice will 
probably depend on the degree of repugnance the court entertains towards 
closed shop agreements in particular and on the degree of friendliness it 
entertains towards collective bargaining in general. In an Ohio case72 
the members of court were divided on the severability of the closed shop 
provision from the remainder of the agreement. The majority, holding 
it inseverable, refused to enforce an arbitration award made under another 
section of the agreement. This would seem to be an unnecessary result 
even on common law principles-and it was so urged by the minority- 
unless the court was determined to show its dislike for the illegal pro- 
vision in every possible way. It may well be doubted whether the decision 
would be the same today when collective bargaining is fostered, so far 
as industries engaged in interstate commerce are concerned, by the Federal 
government. Any court which is zealous to uphold collective bargains 
generally but which also feels that closed shop provisions ought to be 
discouraged will probably work its solution out along some such lines as 
these: (1) If the union or one of its members is suing on the agreement 
it will inquire whether granting the relief asked for is, in fact, enforce- 
ment of the illegal provision and, if it finds that it is not, will disregard 
it. (2) If the employer is suing on the agreement, it will inquire whether 
the agreement would have been made at all-i.e., whether the employer's 
promise to run closed shop was an important part of the consideration for 
the union's counter-promises which are now being sued on-if the illegal 
provision had not been included and will deny relief only if it finds that 
the closed shop provision does attain this status.73 
Another question will arise when any of the labor relations boards are 
faced with having to decide whether the refusal of an employer to bargain 
about a closed shop agreement is an unfair labor practice and the 
71. Smith v. Bowen, 232 Mass. 106, 110, 121 N. E. 814, 816 (1919); Shinsky v. 
O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 102, 105, 121 N. E. 790, 791 (1919). Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Lion 
Shoe Co., 97 F. (2d) 448, 457 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938). 
72. Polk v. Cleveland Railway Co., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808 (1925). 
73. On the severability of illegal provisions from legal, see ANSON, CONTRACT (Cor- 
bin's 5th Am. ed. 1930) 322, 323, particularly the American footnotes; 3 WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS (1920) ?? 1779, 1780, 1782; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) ?? 606, 607. 
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employer's defense is put squarely on the illegality of such an agreement.74 
Both the boards and the courts called on to enforce their orders will have, 
in such a case, a choice of solutions before them: They may decide, if 
they are addicted to words, that because such an agreement is "illegal" 
no order to bargain about it should be issued or enforced. Or they may 
inquire into the nature of the illegality set up as a defense and, finding 
that it is illegal in the sense only of being unenforceable75 or, at most, 
subjecting the union to liability at the suit of a discharged non-union man, 
decide that it is a fair subject for bargaining. 
74. The National Labor Relations Act leaves the legality of a closed shop agreement 
where it was before the Act. See the proviso to ? 8(3) and the explanation of it given 
in the REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, No. 573, 74th 
Cong. 1st Sess. (1935) 11 (reprinted in Prentice-Hall Labor Law Service, 1 15,311). 
Most of the State Acts in terms do nothing to change the common law of the jurisdic- 
tion. Three of them-Mass. Acts, 1937, c. 436, ? 8(3); N. Y. Laws, 1937, c. 443, 
? 704(5); Utah Laws, 1937, c. 55, ? 9(3)-copy the proviso of the Federal Act practically 
verbatim; one-Pa. Laws, 1937, No. 294, ? 6(c)-makes a few apparently insignificant 
changes; and one-Wis. Laws, 1937, c. 51, as amended Laws, 1937, c. 173, ? 111.08(2)- 
adds a new confusion by providing that "all-union" agreements are valid so far as the 
Act is concerned if "the employee [affected by the agreement is] eligible to membership" 
in the union (quaere whether the test of eligibility is meant to be the man or the job). 
75. On the issue of whether an agreement must be reduced to writing or not, the 
Board has insisted that the Act contemplates an "enforceable" agreement. See In the 
Matter of St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 39 (1936), particularly at 49ff. 
Quaere whether this will, or ought, to carry over to the question raised in the text. Where 
the employer has urged that a strike for a closed shop precludes his employees from peti- 
tioning the Board, the Board has uniformly held that the benefits of the Act cannot thus 
be taken away. See In the Matter of Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Enamel- 
ing and Stamping Mill Employees Union, 1 N. L. R. B. 181, 194 (1936); In the Mat- 
ter of Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 125, 142 (1936). 
76. The closed shop agreement may also raise some pretty conflict of laws problems 
in the case of the run-away shop and in connection with regional or nation-wide bargain- 
ing between a union and groups of employers. Though the problems are suggested by the 
cases, they have not yet been put in issue. See Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic 
Smelting & Refining Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 297 (1920). On the run-away shop 
problem in general, see Comment (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 776; Dubinsky v. Blue Dale 
Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 282 N. Y. Supp. 622 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Farulla v. Freundlich, 
152 Misc. 761, 274 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 
631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1928); Goldman v. Rosenzweig, 10 LAW AND LABOR 
207 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1928); Goldman v. Wile Importing Co., 10 LAW AND LABOR 207 
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1928); Goldstein v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 328 Pa. 
385, 196 Atl. 43 (1938); David Adler & Sons v. Maglio, 200 Wis. 153, 228 N. W. 123 (1929). 
The N. L. R. B. has, in a series of cases, condemned moving or threatening to move 
plants in order to escape the obligation to bargain collectively. Matter of S & K Knee 
Pants Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 940, 946, 951 (1937); Matter of Lion Shoe Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 
819, 825 (1937); Matter of Remington Rand, 2 N. L. R. B. 626 (1937); Matter of 
Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 802 (1937). 
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Apart from the effect which a closed shop provision has on the job- 
security and job-opportunity of non-members, the collective agreement 
affects or may affect non-members in another way. If the path marked 
out from the time of Lumley v. Gye to that of the Hitchman case77 is to 
be followed, we may expect that the courts will, at the instance of a 
union which has a collective bargain with an employer, enjoin the union's 
rivals from inducing the employer to break it. And such has been the 
result in some of the cases.78 It was pointed out above79 that this tort 
was one of the conceptual foundations of Schlesinger v. Quinto. Since 
then, however, the New York Court of Appeals has apparently decided 
that, where a collective agreement is at stake,-at least where an agree- 
ment to deal only with a given union is at stake-and where the defendant 
is a union, the outcome of the case shall turn not on the issue of contract 
or no-contract, not even on the issue of going relationship or no-going 
relationship, but on whether the means used to induce the breach are within 
the bounds of fair persuasion. Such seems to have been its position in 
Stillwell Theatres v. Kaplan:80 
"We would be departing from established precedents if we upheld 
this injunction. We would thereby give to one labor union an ad- 
vantage over another by prohibiting the use of peaceful and honest 
persuasion in matters of economic and social rivalry. This might 
strike a death blow to legitimate labor activities. It is not within the 
province of the courts to restrain conduct which is within the allow- 
able area of economic conflict." 
77. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917). 
78. Tracey v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25, 114 N. E. 959 (1917); Lovely v. Gill, 245 
Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923); Henke & Pillot v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 109 
S. W. (2d) 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Rosedeer Mining Co. v. Beard, 3 LAW AND 
LABOR 15 (Alberta Sup. Ct. 1920). Cf. Kinloch Telephone Co. v. Local Union No. 2, 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 265 Fed. 312 (E. D. Mo. 1920), 
rev'd, 275 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 662 (1922); British 
Columbia Telephone Co. v. Morrison, 29 B. C. 289 (1921). But cf. Blankenship v. 
Kaufman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. 
App. 516, 279 S. W. 232 (1926); The Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 
294, 156 N. E. 243 (1927). Compare the employer-plaintiff cases, note 86 infra. 
79. See p. 201, supra. 
80. 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 606 (1932). Accord: 
J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Buy-Wise 
Markets v. Winokur, 167 Misc. 235, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 854 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For samples 
of injunctions in the pre-Stillwell days, see Michaels v. Hillman, 111 Misc. 284, 181 
N. Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Pleaters & Stitchers Association v. Taft, 131 Misc. 
506, 227 N. Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Wolchak v. Wiseman, 145 Misc. 268, 277, 
259 N. Y. Supp. 225, 234 (Sup. Ct. 1932); cf. Sum v. Independent Retail Fruit 
Merchants' Association, 144 Misc. 684, 258 N. Y. Supp. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Accord: 
Hotel, Restaurant & Soda Fountain Employees Local Union v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 
114 S. W. (2d) 501 (1938). 
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The way in which the question was presented to the court-it was an 
application by a group of employers to restrain activities "calculated to 
induce or cause" them to break their contracts with a rival of the defendant 
union-may have given the court the opportunity to reach the result it 
did,81 but it seems fairly clear that the outcome would have been the 
same even if, as in the more usual case, the plaintiff had been the actual 
promisee of the bargain.82 
The pressure method employed in the Stillwell case was picketing of 
the employer's place of business. Other considerations aside, the result 
of the case is particularly welcome at a time when two national labor 
unions are fighting each other. So far, at least, as the appeal is to the 
employer's customers, such picketing is a fair way of informing the 
public of the dispute and of permitting it to express its sympathy for or 
antipathy towards one or the other of the rivals. To forbid it would 
be to hide from the patron information which might influence his choice. 
Such a result, moreover, implicitly recognizes a solidarity of interest 
between an employer and his employees.83 If loss of customers has been 
an allowable method in the past for persuading employers to deal with 
a union, loss of work via loss of customers may be an allowable method 
for persuading employees to shift their allegiance from one union to 
another.84 The pressure may, in other words, be as much directed towards 
inducing the employees to become members of another group as it is 
towards inducing the employer to discharge his workers and to give their 
jobs to another group. With this turn in outlook, one of the original 
justifications for pressure on the employer-rivalry for jobs-is forgotten 
and there is substituted for it an end-the strengthening of the union 
itself-which is still looked on askance by more conservative courts. But 
accepting this as a legitimate end, another desideratum, the openness of 
the union which is putting on the pressure, is suggested. This, in turn, 
might better be used as a criterion for determining legality vel non in the 
case of a closed shop agreement than the test now applied.85 Openness 
81. See 259 N. Y. 405, at 412. For a criticism of this and the Pleaters and Stitchers 
decision, supra note 80, see (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 1248. 
82. De Agostina v. Holmden, 157 Misc. 819, 285 N. Y. Supp. 909 (Sup. Ct. 1935). 
83. In many of the more orthodox cases, considerable verbal weight has been given 
to allegations that the plaintiff's employees were satisfied with the conditions of their 
work, etc. If such an allegation is anything more than pure make-weight, which is 
doubtful, the analogy to the situation suggested in the text is a fair one, for the employer 
is there using his employees' satisfaction as a means of protecting himself from charges 
of unfairness and the like. For a recent example, see Keith Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon, 
134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692 (1936). But cf. Schuster v. International Association of 
Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50 (1937). 
84. See Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 309, 174 N. E. 690, 691 (1931). 
85. Cf. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Ati. 
720 (Ch. 1938), enjoining closed union from enforcing a closed shop agreement against 
the employer to the detriment of plaintiff-employee whom it would not admit to member- 
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of the union is, in any event, a test which will almost certainly have to 
be applied if the New York rule is to be continued under the Federal and 
State Labor Relations Acts. For under these statutes it is not a union 
that is protected, but the employees' choice of their bargaining agency free 
from employer interference. Though it is not unarguable that pressure on 
the employer to fire employees who refuse to join a given union is ille- 
gitimate if he has already made an agreement with them through another 
bargaining agency,86 the argument fails to consider that the pressure may 
be directed not towards making the employer do what he is forbidden 
to do but towards persuading his employees to do what they are free 
to do. As in New York where the courts may at once enjoin the employer 
from breaking a contract with one union and refuse to enjoin another 
union from calling the public's attention, by picketing, to the unfairness 
of the employer in refusing to deal with them,87 so under the Acts it 
may be said that the hurt to the employer arising from such picketing is 
ship. The half-apologetic position of the Massachusetts court in Hoban v. Dempsey, 
217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. 717 (1914), the more enthusiastic note of the Appellate Division 
in Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d 
Dep't 1904), and the emphasis placed on the refusal of the defendant union to admit new 
members in such cases as Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' & Trimmers' Assembly, 77 Md. 
396, 26 Atl. 505 (1893) and Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291, 106 N. E. 1000 
(1914) [cf. Reynolds v. Shipping Federation, (1924) 1 Ch. 28 (pointing out the unwil- 
lingness of the plaintiff to join the defendant union)] could be used to advantage by a 
court which felt inclined to go in this direction. The difficulty of applying such a test, 
however, is persuasive of the desirability of further administrative, rather than curial, 
power over labor litigation. For citations to prior discussions of the "open union" question, 
see Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective 
Bargaining (1937) 50 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1074. 
86. See id. at 1107. "But if the strike is to compel the employer to bargain with 
an organization which, under the decision of the board [N. L. R. B.], he is duty bound 
not to bargain with, a law-abiding employer would be an unenviable position if he could 
not get injunctive relief. The statute does not make the strike illegal. But the statute 
imposes a duty upon the employer, and a strike to compel a person to violate his duty 
may be held illegal on common law principles." 
The lower Federal courts generally hold that as long as the employer has not 
bargained with a union certified by the National Labor Relations Board the existence 
of an agreement with a union does not change the otherwise applicable rules. Lund v. 
Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn. 1937); Sharpe & Dohme 
v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F. Supp. 701 (E. D. Pa. 1938); Houston 
& North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 24 F. 
Supp. 619 (W. D. Okla. 1938). But cf. Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263, 266 
(W. D. Mo. 1937). But after certification the applicable rules are different. Oberman 
& Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W. D. Mo. 1937); cf. Union 
Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks Union, 2 L. R. R. 523, 664 (E. D. Pa. 1938). 
Compare the cases cited notes 78 ff. supra. 
87. This apparent dilemma was foreseen even a few months before the decision in the 
Stillwell Theatres case. Esco Operating Corp. v. Kaplan, 144 Misc. 646, 647, 258 N. Y. 
Supp. 303, 305-306 (Sup. Ct. 1932); I. J. Fox, Inc. v. Gold, 87 N. Y. L. J. 354 (Sup. 
Ct. 1932). 
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"incidental" to the legitimate object of winning over members from one 
organization to another through whatever pressure an informed public 
may bring to bear on them through the employer.88 
This, however, suggests still another problem: Given a closed shop 
agreement between the X corporation and the Y union, and given suc- 
cessful pressure by the Z union on the X corporation's employees to aban- 
don the Y union and to join the Z union, will this not leave the X cor- 
poration open to a suit for breach of contract by the Y union ? 89 The 
problem is acutely raised by the conflict in aims of contract law and of the 
labor relations acts. The acts, as has already been pointed out, deal with 
a choice of bargaining agencies by the employees. They do not deal, 
except incidentally, with protecting the interests of unions in agreements 
made with employers. If they mean what they say, the duty of the em- 
ployer to bargain with his employees through an agency of their own 
choosing is a continuous one. Contract law, per contra, runs in terms of 
two parties who have bound themselves to deal with each other. These 
two sets of rules will have to be harmonized in some way: employers can- 
not fairly be subjected to damage suits or to decrees of specific per- 
formance by the courts and, at the same time, to orders by the govern- 
ment authorities to cease engaging in unfair labor practices. Granting 
that there are other ways out,90 the best way, it would seem, would be to 
recognize such closed shop agreements as in force only so long as the 
contracting union maintains its leadership in the employer's plant, and 
subject always to an implied condition that if this leadership is lost the 
union shall have no cause of action against the employer for breach.91 
88. Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 409, 182 N. E. 63 (1932). 
89. Two cases must be distinguished: (1) "erosion", in which the members drift 
away one by one; here the closed shop agreement will presumably operate automatically 
to relieve them from their jobs; (2) "avulsion", in which there is a wholesale turnover 
of members from one union to another. We are only concerned with the latter. 
90. E.g., by saying that the union members are bound by their organization's bargain 
and cannot get out of it by shifting allegiance. This is the attitude of the lower courts 
where the issue has been presented. M. & M. Woodworking Co. v. Plywood and Veneer 
Workers Local Union No. 102, 23 F. Supp. 11, 18 (D. Ore. 1938); Mason Manufacturing 
Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 2 L. R. R. 838 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938); Pennsylvania 
Labor Relations Board v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Service, 
IT 19,531, 2 L. R. R. 317 (Pa. C. P. 1937). Compare World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 1 L. R. R. 608 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) (change of affiliation of union from A. F. of L. 
to C. I. 0. does not bar its suing on agreement). The National Labor Relations Board 
has taken the general position suggested in the text. Matter of Pennsylvania Greyhound 
Lines, 3 N. L. R. B., 622 (1937); Matter of M. & M. Woodworking Co., 6 N. L. R. B., 
No. 55 (1938). Cf. In the Matter of The Kinnear Manufacturing Co., 4 N. L. R. B., 773 (1938); In the Matter of Northrop Corp., 3 N. L. R. B. 228 (1937). 
91. This will be qualified, of course, by the willingness of the Board, State or Federal, 
to order elections. The prevailing rule of the National Board is not to order an election 
more often than once a year unless strong cause is shown. Most unions are opposed to 
long term agreements in any event. But with the present strong conflict between two 
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A further problem to which attention is invited by the growth of the 
collective bargaining system is the status of the collective agreement when 
an employer goes into an insolvency court. It is a problem, not heretofore 
acute, which may be of considerable importance the next time a wave of 
business failures hits the country. Its setting is suggested by the situation 
in In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Incorporated.92 The court, immediately after 
approving a petition for reorganization under ? 77B, was faced with an 
application by the debtor to be permitted to discard a collective agreement 
by which it was bound. Pointing out that the agreement had been made 
after a long dispute in the industry and that the petitioner's great excess 
of assets over liabilities raised doubts as to whether the whole of the 
proceeding had not been instituted in an effort to discard the agreement 
rather than to effect a reorganization as contemplated by the Act, the 
court disallowed the petition.93 To the debtor's claim that the closed shop 
provision of the agreement ran counter to the statutory prohibition against 
requiring employees to join or not to join a union, the court's reply was 
that that objection could be raised only by an employee. Beyond this, 
however, the petitioner urged that the whole agreement be discarded under 
the court's authority to order rejection of executory contracts. It was 
urged particularly that relief under the Act was necessary "because its [the 
petitioner's] labor expenses, pursuant to the contract, were out of all pro- 
portion to its volume of business and that no feasible plan of reorgani- 
zation providing for a fair prospect of profit in the future can be put 
forth as long as the contract remains in force." This, too, the court 
rejected, pointing out that the collective agreement itself provided for 
reorganizations, leaving the inference that it thought the granting of the 
application would give the petitioner an unwarranted advantage over its 
competitors. That it would have given the petitioner this advantage is 
clear. 
Whatever the legal theory of insolvency proceedings may be, they are, 
in their economic effects, useful as a means of writing off a top-heavy 
capital structure and of readjusting production costs to changes in the 
price level. One asks whether this rehabilitation ought also to carry with 
it permission to compete with lowered labor costs. There are respectable 
authorities who argue, and there are cogent reasons for believing, that 
wholesale cuts in the spending power of the lower income groups do not 
rival groups, attempts may be made to hamstring a situation by writing an agreement 
for more than one or a few years. For a statement of policy against judicial sanction 
of such long term contracts by use of the injunctive power, see De Agostina v. Holmden, 
157 Misc. 819, 285 N. Y. Supp. 909 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Courts could find ample precedent 
in the restraint of trade cases to cut down an agreement to a reasonable time or, prefer- 
ably, to refuse to enforce it after a reasonable time. 
92. 12 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). 
93. Cf. the outcome of the petition in bankruptcy filed by Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 
as reported 2 N. L. R. B. 802 (1937). 
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aid in making recovery any easier after a depression. A court guided by 
this belief will reach different results from a court which sees in the col- 
lective bargain merely another executory contract. 
It may be, of course, that different provisions of the collective bargain 
will yield to different treatment in the reorganization court. Certainly, so 
far as a closed shop provision is concerned, there is no reason, except 
that wages are likely to be lower in an open shop, for giving greater lati- 
tude to an insolvent firm than is permitted others. Nor would there seem 
to be any good reason for permitting seniority provisions, for instance, 
to go into the discard. And, if the belief set out above is justified, there 
is good reason for not disrupting the painfully worked out labor standards 
-wages, hours, and working conditions-contained in such bargains, par- 
ticularly if they are common throughout an industry. To allow an em- 
ployer to gain an advantage over his competitors by cutting down wages, 
increasing hours, or lowering the conditions under which his employees 
work would be an admission that he is entitled to compete on whatever level 
he can regardless of the public effect or the social cost of that competition 
-an admission that a company which cannot stand the gaff even with 
a devalued plant and deflated liabilities is entitled to make and market its 
product at lower labor standards than other firms. Such an admission in 
the case of one firm would be likely to force a similar admission for all of 
its similarly situated competitors. The bankruptcy of management could 
lead to the bankruptcy of collective bargaining. One cannot, then, but 
approve of the court's rejection of the application and inquire whether 
the law of this case ought not to be written into the law of the land to 
avoid trouble in the future. 
Not all the cases that we have had in the past have turned out so for- 
tunately as did In re Mamie Conti Gowns.94 In one instance it has been 
held that an equity receiver takes over the management, free from any 
duty theretofore cast on the company not to discharge workers without 
cause and, if demanded, a hearing.95 In another, it has been held that 
though a receiver proceeded to arbitrate a wage dispute as provided in 
the collective agreement, no suit for back wages could be maintained on 
the award after all the property, together with all liabilities incurred during 
receivership, had been turned back to the company, on the ground that 
neither the collective agreement nor the arbitration award had been adopted 
94. Continental Trust Co. of New York v. Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City Ry., 
59 Fed. 514 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1894) (no interference with receiver's discretion in 
reducing wages unless abused); Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & T. P. Ry., 62 
Fed. 17 (S. D. Ohio, 1894); United States Trust Co. of New York v. Omaha & St. Louis 
Ry., 63 Fed. 737 (C. C. S. D. Iowa, 1894). But cf. Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fed. 149 (C. C. W. D. Ga. 1893), and compare Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 62 Fed. 7 (C. C. Neb., 
1894) with Dexter v. Union Pac. Ry., 75 Fed. 947 (C. C. Neb., 1896). 
95. In re Seattle, Lake Shore & Eastern Ry., 61 Fed. 541, 542 (C. C. Wash. 1894). 
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by the court.96 Even administrative rulings and the acts of Congress under 
which they were made-to pursue an analogy suggested above-have not 
escaped. Though Mr. Justice Holmes phrased his position cautiously 
in holding that the Adamson Act's wages and hours provisions did not 
apply to a railroad in receivership -pointing out that the law had been 
enacted in great haste, he wrote: "We cannot suppose that it was meant 
to forbid work being done at a less price than the rates laid down, when 
both parties to the bargain wished to go on as before and when the cir- 
cumstances of the road were so exceptional that the lower compensation 
would not affect the market for labor upon other roads"-his few words 
on the possibility of a constitutional issue were seized on by inferior courts 
to justify a refusal to apply similar statutes to other insolvent corpora- 
tions. Without considering the matter further, they proceeded on the 
assumption that to require an insolvent road to pay the wages prescribed 
by decisions of the Railway Labor Board would constitute a taking of 
property without due process of law.98 It may be that under the cir- 
cumstances prevailing in these cases the decisions were correct. If so, 
they ought not to be extended carelessly to cases where they are unwar- 
ranted. The constitutional question left in the air by Mr. Justice Holmes 
but seized on as doctrine by these courts should be checked very carefully. 
It would be particularly disastrous if it should be extended and if, at the 
same time, there should be a reassertion of a doctrine formerly taught, 
in dictum at least, that "interference" by strikers with the management 
of a plant in receivership is a contempt of court.99 
II. 
The quantity of mental luggage that a lawyer carries around with him 
in order to answer a simple question is sometimes amazing. Perhaps 
this is the reason for the law's reputation as a learned profession. In 
point is the discussion raised by the question: Can an individual union 
96. Amalgamated Association of Street & Electric Ry. Employees v. Des Moines City 
Ry., 14 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). 
97. Fort Smith & Western Railroad Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S. 206 (1920). It appears 
that the men employed were willing to work for less than the rates prescribed by the 
Act. "To break up such a bargain would be at least unjust and impolitic and not at all 
within the ends that the Adamson Law had in view." Id. at 209. 
98. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Missouri & No. Ark. R. R., 270 Fed. 796 (E. D. 
Ark. 1921); Coffee v. Gray, 158 Ga. 218, 122 S. E. 687 (1924), writ of error dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction, 268 U. S. 680 (1925); Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. 
Atlanta, Birmingham & A. Ry., 271 Fed. 731, 738 (N. D. Ga. 1921). 
99. The cases are reviewed in Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal Consequences-An 
Examination of the Receivership Precedent for the Labor Injunction (1931) 40 YALE L. 
J. 507; see (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 882. For a more recent example, see In re Cleveland 
& Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Ohio 1935) (injunction against inter- 
ference with removal of machinery and goods in process from one plant to another 
during jurisdictional labor dispute granted; Norris-LaGuardia Act held inapplicable). 
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member sue on the collective agreement? Were it not for an exaggerated 
notion of the importance of privity of contract, there would be little diffi- 
culty in answering the question. As it is, however, whether as counsel 
or as court, we have to go through a long rigamarole chock-full of 
doctrinally persuasive terminology to get a desirable result. 
Doctrine aside, the essential problems in deciding whether an individual 
may sue on a collective agreement are much the same as those involved 
in deciding whether he may sue under a minimum wage statute which is 
itself silent on the subject. The proper inquiries are: Was the statute 
intended, inter alia, for his benefit? Can his benefit, and that of others, 
be best preserved if we adopt this as one method of enforcing its pro- 
visions? Is there any good reason why it should not be enforced in this 
way? 
City of Phoenix v. Drinkwaterloo provides us with a line of reasoning 
that could well be applied to the collective bargaining cases if we were 
prepared to admit that they are at all comparable in social aim or in doc- 
trinal solution. Here the statute in question required municipal corpora- 
tions to pay their employees specified wages. It imposed a penalty for 
failure to pay those wages, but made no provision for a civil action by 
an individual to collect the wages. Yet the court allowed recovery of the 
statutory amount by a worker who had accepted less, apparently without 
protest.10' The mere fact of his employment was held to obligate the city 
to pay him the full statutory amount: 
"The statute, it will be seen, has a two-fold purpose. One is to 
secure to the individual workman a minimum living wage, fixed by 
law, and the other is to penalize the employer who fails to pay that 
wage. With both purposes before us, we certainly think that it would 
be defeating the intent of the Legislature, so far as the first is con- 
100. 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. (2d) 1175 (1935). Cf. Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. 
Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 33 F. (2d) 13, 16 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929), aff'd, 281 
U. S. 548 (1930); Rhodes v. New Orleans Great Northern R. R., 129 Miss. 78, 94, 91 So. 
281, 282 (1922). 
101. No issue was raised on this point. Cf. City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 
478, 52 P. (2d) 1178 (1935) (right not waivable; plaintiff's acceptance of the lower pay 
without protest did not, under the circumstances, estop him from claiming the difference 
later). Accord that a statutorily given right of employees to be paid off within a 
specified number of hours after discharge cannot be waived: Cato v. Grendel Cotton 
Mills, 132 S. C. 454, 129 S. E. 203 (1924). See Burdette v. Broadview Dairy Co., 123 
Wash. 158, 212 Pac. 181 (1923); Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 650, 171 Pac. 1037, 1039 
(1918); Pederson v. Portland, 144 Ore. 437, 24 P. (2d) 1031 (1933) (acceptance and 
endorsement of pay checks "in full" for all wages due to date does not bar plaintiff 
from maintaining his action). But cf. Ryan v. City of New York, 177 N. Y. 271, 278, 
69 N. E. 599, 600 (1904) with Pitt v. Board of Education, 216 N. Y. 304, 309, 110 N. E. 
612, 613 (1915); Wright v. State of New York, 223 N. Y. 44, 48, 119 N. E. 83, 84 (1918). 
See Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Rankin, 170 Tenn. 651, 98 S. W. (2d) 311 (1936); 
Konode v. Houston Collieries Co., 110 W. Va. 227, 157 S. E. 407 (1931). 
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cerned, if we were to hold that the very ones whom the law was 
intended to protect were helpless to secure that protection, and must 
satisfy themselves with knowing that somebody had gone to jail or 
paid a fine for violating the law. Such would, indeed, be a Pyrrhic 
victory for the workman, consoling perhaps to his feelings, but of 
very little value in giving to him what the law says he has earned 
and is due him." 102 
Substitute for "legislature" and "statute," "union and employer," and 
"collective agreement" respectively, eliminate the notion of penalty, and 
add, what is already implicit in the statute, the notion of preventing 
competition below the wage level set by it, and the argument fits as well 
for a collective bargain as it does for an act of the legislature. 
If something closer to the contract pattern presented by the collective 
bargain is called for, there are the cases in which a public contractor, 
bound by an agreement with the government to pay a specified rate of 
wages to his employees, is sued by an employee.'03 And there are the 
cases which arose while the President's Re-employment Agreement was 
in force.'04 In both instances, without much difficulty, the courts gener- 
ally allowed recovery. Why then all the fuss and bother over permitting 
a union member to sue on his collective agreement? The answer lies at 
least partly in verbal difficulties. For attempts to characterize the col- 
lective bargain when deciding on the rights and duties of individual em- 
ployees and employers under it have not been particularly successful. On 
the rhetorical level, for instance, are such descriptions as those of Judge 
Sibley in Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Webb,105 in which 
he stamped it as something which "whether made in an atmosphere of 
102. 46 Ariz. 470, 472 (1935). 
103. Stover v. Winston Brothers Co., 185 Wash. 416, 55 P. (2d) 821 (1936), appeal 
dismissed for want of a Federal question, 299 U. S. 508 (1936), (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 
706; Hearn v. Ralph Sollitt & Sons Construction Co., 93 S. W. (2d) 551 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1936); Turney v. J. H. Hillman Co., 112 Ore. 122, 228 Pac. 933 (1924) (such a 
claim cannot be waived). Such a claim cannot be defeated on a plea of accord and 
satisfaction by accepting and endorsing pay checks made out "in full" payment for 
wages. Goebel v. Elliott, 178 Wash. 444, 35 P. (2d) 44 (1934). But cf. United States 
for use of Johnson v. Morley Construction Co., 17 F. Supp. 378, 390 (W. D. N. Y. 
1936); United States for use of Boucher v. Murphy, 11 F. Supp. 572, 573 (W. D. Mich. 
1935); Kutsche & Co. v. Anderson, 169 Tenn. 98, 83 S. W. (2d) 243 (1935); Kutsche 
& Co. v. Keith, 169 Tenn. 399, 402, 88 S. W. (2d) 454, 455 (1935). 
104. A large number of these cases concerned the allowance of recovery of the differ- 
ence between wages paid and agreed upon in the President's Re-employment Agreement 
(an agreement between the President and individual employers). For discussion of 
whether the P. R. A. was a contract, see Comment (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1314. But 
cf. West v. Norcross, 190 Ark. 667, 80 S. W. (2d) 67 (1935); McDonald v. Pend 
Oreille Mines & Metals Co., 189 Wash. 389, 65 P. (2d) 1250 (1937) (in suit for differ- 
ence between wages paid and those prescribed by the P. R. A., held, the Agreement 
was void because of government coercion or duress), (1937) 32 ILL. L. REV. 356. 
105. 64 F. (2d) 902, 903 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). 
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peace or under the stress of a strike or lockout resembles in many ways 
a treaty." To the same class belongs M. Duguit's characterization of it as 
"a law establishing permanent relationship between two social groups, the 
legal rule according to which the individual contracts between members 
of these two groups are to be concluded."'106 Hardly less rhetorical is 
Judge Sibley's further attempt at delineation-"a mutual general offer 
to be closed by specific acceptances."'107 As indicating the results which 
will flow from the presence of a collective bargain these suggestions leave 
much to be desired, however adequately they may indicate the general 
outlook or hopes of the writers. The term begins to acquire apparent 
legal significance when it becomes a custom-a practice which is "certain, 
general, uniform, and recognized" 108-or a usage-"an established method 
of dealing, adopted in a particular place, or by those engaged in a par- 
ticular vocation or trade."109 A New York court suggests two more 
ideas in one sentence when it calls the agreement "a contract made by his 
representative for his benefit" 1"0-that the individual employee is a party 
to a contract made on his behalf by the union as agent"' and that he is 
a third party beneficiary of the contract."2 Ill fitting though they may be, 
it is these last three that represent the more common expression of the 
courts. 113 
These attempts to force a new relationship into old molds could well 
be criticized at the verbal level. To call a deliberate agreement arrived 
at after prolonged deliberation, presumably subject to change by the 
parties' mutual consent, and existing, by its own terms, for a specified 
period, a "custom" or a "usage," is stretching the terms a bit further 
than they have heretofore been stretched."14 To call the union an agent 
for its members raises doubts: What, for instance, is the status of an 
agent the result of whose negotiations or whose very authority to make 
106. (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 753, 765. 
107. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902, 903 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); 
Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 126 Neb. 493, 500, 253 N. W. 694, 698 (1934). 
108. Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 681, 59 S. W. (2d) 560, 562 (1933). 
109. Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 717, 154 
S. W. 47, 50 (1913) (quoting an earlier case in the same jurisdiction). 
110. Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 295, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952, 953-954, (3d 
Dep't 1914). 
111. Mueller v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 194 Minn. 83, 85, 259 N. W. 
798, 799 (1935). 
112. See McGlohn v. Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Co., 179 Miss. 396, 407, 174 So. 
250, 252 (1937); Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926) (does 
not appear whether plaintiff a union member or not); Volquardsen v. Southern Amuse- 
ment Co., 156 So. 678, 679 (La. App. 1934). 
113. For another doctrine, believed to be in the process of emerging, see infra note 
146. 
114. For an example in this field of the usual meaning of custom, see United States 
Daily Publishing Corp. v. Nichols, 59 App. D. C. 34, 32 F. (2d) 834 (1929). 
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the agreement in the first place may have been voted against by the same 
"principal" who is now suing on the contract? To designate the member 
a third party beneficiary-akin to the unborn child named for the promisor 
or the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy-raises similar ques- 
tions, for this is a "third party" who may have participated in the making 
of the agreement, who may have voted against it, who may have asked 
for a better bargain than the one that was actually made, and who is, in 
practically every case, a part of the party who made the agreement. 
Doubtless sufficient dialectic can make these quibbles seem small. 
Analogy, if refined and abstract enough, can induce us to believe that a 
collective agreement in an industry is sufficiently "like" a custom-a some- 
thing taken for granted as long as it exists, not deliberately made by the 
person who is now before the court-to be treated as such. Dialectic, if 
sufficiently refined, can also point out that like Rousseau's perfect demo- 
crat the member of the trade union owes his first duty to the will of the 
majority. He is at best but one of many in his organization; his individual 
will has but small part in making a minority into a majority or a majority 
into a minority. Having abided by the will of the majority, whether that 
will is his will or not, he is entitled to profit by whatever bargain that 
will made for him; and this applies to him whether he be treated as a 
principal represented in the negotiations by the will of the majority or 
as a third party outside of that will completely. 
One need not continue along this line. It is more important to ask 
what the consequences of adopting one or another of these concepts is, 
how far they have been adopted as judged by their "normal" consequences, 
and how far these consequences-assuming them to be spelled out for the 
collective agreement as they have been for other types of transaction- 
make it desirable for the courts to adopt one or another, to blend them, 
or to work out a concept which, if not entirely new, is at least somewhat 
different from either the pure stuff or the amalgam which may result 
from these. The words we use may suggest the result in an unsettled 
situation; they do not dictate it. One must take the formalistic language 
as descriptive rather than as definitive. The mold is not yet sufficiently 
set, one may hope, to leave no way of escape. 
With this in mind we inquire briefly into the creation of the individual 
member's interest. Is it enough for the plaintiff-member to come into 
court saying "I am a member of the union. My union has an agreement 
with the defendant that I will not be discharged without a hearing. I 
have been discharged without a hearing and I want damages," or must 
he say more? If this collective agreement is to be treated as a custom, 
it ought to be that no more is required. If the union be his agent, what 
more can be required unless we are pushed into the field of ostensible 
and express authority? If he be a third party beneficiary, surely by the 
law of the cases no more is necessary. 
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But how do the cases hold? In the factual tests that they set up, they 
break into three groups. The cases in one group are in accord with the 
results that would be expected under the nominally accepted doctrines."5 
A minority group is in total disagreement with them; they hold that, 
for the collective bargain to be of effect in an employee-employer suit, 
something more than mere membership-as, for instance, "acceptance" 
or "ratification" of the agreement-must be shown."6 The third group, 
which may in the end turn out to be a false class, appears to be satisfied 
with a showing that there was an agreement and that the member knew 
of it."' Its position has been most clearly stated by the Tennessee court :118 
the legal effect of the agreement between the operators and 
miners is that it became part of and formed the basis of the contract 
of employment between each operator accepting it and each of his 
115. Bell v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 228 Ala. 328, 331, 335, 153 So. 434, 436, 439 
(1934) semble, (collective bargain in issue partly as employer's defense); Mastell v. 
Salo, 140 Ark. 408, 215 S. W. 583 (1919); Florestano v. Northern Pacific Ry., 198 Minn. 
203, 269 N. W. 407 (1936) (collective bargain in issue partly as employer's defense); 
Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914); Johnson v. 
American Ry. Express Co., 163 S. C. 191, 161 S. E. 473 (1931); Beatty v. Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R. R., 49 Wyo. 22, 32, 52 P. (2d) 404, 407 (1935). 
116. The leading case is Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 
(1904). The defendant-employer is attempting to use the collective bargain as a defense 
against plaintiff's claim; perhaps this helped to condition the outcome of the case. Other 
courts seem to be equally reluctant to permit an employer to set up this sort of a defense. 
The Henry S. Grove, 22 F. (2d) 444 (D. Md. 1922); Ahlquist v. Alaska Portland 
Packers' Association, 39 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930). Compare the results in those 
cases in which the bargain prescribes a mode of procedure [supra note 31, and infra 
note 1301 or in which the employer as plaintiff relies on a provision of the bargain infra 
notes 139 if. Compare, also, the results reached by the lower Missouri courts, infra 
note 117. 
Cases in accord, doctrinally or on their facts: Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & 
Tex. Pac. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47 (1913) semble, (self-contradictory on whether 
"ratification" is always required) [With which compare Saulsberry v. Coopers Inter- 
national Union, 147 Ky. 170, 173, 143 S. W. 1018, 1020 (1912)]; Panhandle & Santa Fe 
Ry. v. Wilson, 55 S. W. (2d) 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); West v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 
103 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927); Kessell v. Great Northern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 304 
(W. D. Wash. 1931); Holland v. London Society of Compositors, 40 T. L. RP 44() 
(K. B. 1924); Bancroft v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 30 Manitoba 401 (1920). 
117. Cf. Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S. W. 436 (1920) 
[with which compare Mastell v. Salo, 140 Ark. 408, 215 S. W. 583 (1919), cited note 
115 supra]; Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655 (1935) (collective bargain 
in issue partly as employer's defense; not clear that knowledge is required) ; McCoy v. 
St. Joseph Belt Ry., 229 Mo. App. 506, 512, 77 S. W. (2d) 175, 179 (1934); Lyons v. 
St. Joseph Belt Ry., 84 S. W. (2d) 933 (Mo. App. 1935) [with which compare 
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904), cited note 116 
supra]; Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928) 
(an excellent exhibition of willingness to uphold a collective agreement). See Keysaw 
v. Dotterweich Brewing Co., 121 App. Div. 58, 59, 105 N. Y. Supp. 562, 563 (4th Dep't 
1907). 
118. Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 468, 9 S. W. (2d) 692, 694 
(1928). 
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employees, who entered or continued in the service and employment 
of such employer with knowledge of its execution and in the absence 
of any express contract between the individual employee and his 
employer inconsistent with the terms of the agreement." 
If these are the results when a member of the union sues on the agree- 
ment, what is to be expected if the plaintiff is a non-member? If one 
consistently held to the "custom" doctrine, the result should be the same 
whether the plaintiff is member or non-member. So, too, if one adheres 
to third-party beneficiary teachings, unless one can find words which ex- 
plicitly exclude him from the class to be benefited or is willing to make 
an implication to the same effect. But if union is "agent," then must not 
some showing be made that the outsider has, by his own actions, whether 
precedent or subsequent to the negotiation of the bargain, authorized 
or ratified the agreement? It would seem so, though it may be that the 
employer's hiring -him and knowing of the bargain and accepting the 
benefits of his labor, could be construed as a waiver of a right to assert, 
when he is sued on it, that it was not in force."19 But that seems somewhat 
doubtful, too. 
Again, we inquire into the cases. On the one side there is Young v. 
Canadian Northern Railway'20 holding, in a wrongful discharge case, 
that though the employer had treated the plaintiff as if he were within 
the terms of the collective bargain, such facts were insufficient to establish 
"contractual liability by the railway company to the appellant." The court 
said that the treatment could be explained as well by saying that it was "a 
matter of policy" as by saying that the agreement required it and had 
become a part of plaintiff's individual contract of employment.121 
On the other side there is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. 
Sideboard122 which, taking a full-bodied third-party beneficiary position, 
holds that a Negro employee is entitled to the rate of wages provided 
for in an agreement between the employer and a white union. The court 
pointed out that since there was no closed shop provision, the employer 
119. For the converse of this, see Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655 
(1935). 
120. [1931] A. C. 83 (P. C.). See (1932) 26 ILL. L. REV. 922, 924. 
121. In the lower courts ([1929] 4 D. L. R. 452 (Man. K. B.); [19301 3 D. L. R. 
352 (Man. C. A.) ) it appears that plaintiff was not only not a member of the union in 
question but as an adherent of another group had been actively opposed to it. But cf. 
Caven v. Canadian Pac. Ry., [1925] 3 D. L. R. 841, 845 (P. C). For further discussion, 
see [1924] 3 D. L. R. 783 (Alta. S. C.); [1925] 1 D. L. R. 122, 132, 139, 148, 155 (Alta. 
App. Div.). 
122. 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931). The rules specifically required the railroad to 
pay the same wages to Negroes and white men. Id. at 11. See Gregg v. Starks, 188 
Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920); cf. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Webb, 64 F. 
(2d) 902, 904 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Rowlett v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 255 Ky. 
691, 75 S. W. (2d) 371 (1934). 
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would otherwise have too much incentive to displace union with non- 
union men, but that 
"With the rate of pay . . . fixed and secured to all employees, the 
inducement, and the only inducement, that would exist to let out 
union members and let in non-union men, would disappear. Thus 
the interest of the union members in respect to the rate of pay was 
substantially tied into or united with that of nonunion men, including 
colored train employees; and the contract results in this manner to 
and for the benefit of all of them so far as the rates of pay were con- 
cerned; and, being so, appellant as a third party in interest could 
accept and rely on its benefits in respect to the rate of pay and sue 
for the same."'23 
Such cases as this one, however, assume or find a contract between the 
principal parties in the background. Suppose there is no such finding or 
assumption? How, for instance, if there is no consideration to support 
the employer's promises to the union? Can the employee, member or non- 
member, still sue on it? One wonders: If this is a "custom" as to the 
employee, why not? Hasn't it been precisely in those cases in which the 
court was unable to find a contract that it looked for "custom"? So it 
appears.'24 But if there is no contract between union and employer, then 
what of the individual who is the union's "principal"? Still there was a 
holding out by the employer-a holding out on terms suggested by the 
union-"a general offer to be closed by a specific acceptance." And if the 
individual be a third-party beneficiary? It looks as though dialectic headed 
for a result has broken down. He may sue, to be sure, but his suit will 
be in quantum meruit or some equivalent; certainly he cannot sue on an 
agreement that isn't. 
The tangle of possibilities multiplies if it is supposed that the agree- 
ment between union and employer is unenforceable because contra bonos 
mores or illegal. If, in an individual employee's suit, one treats the union- 
employer bargain as a custom one has got to decide whether it is unitary 
or multiple, whether its provisions, legal and illegal, all run together or 
can be separated. Underscoring the word "custom" helps one to suppose 
that they are multiple and severable and, accordingly, that those that are 
illegal can be forgotten. But if the union was the employee's agent? A 
decision whether or not the employer promised him that none but union 
men will be hired has to be made. If he did, the employee's suit is, ex 
hypothesi, lost. If he did not-that is, if some of the promises run to the 
individual, while others, including this one, run only to the union-the 
123. 161 Miss. 4, 16, 133 So. 669, 672 (1931). 
124. See Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 717, 
154 S. W. 47, 50 (1913); Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 679, 59 S. W. (2d) 560, 
561 (1933). 
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result will be otherwise.'25 And if the employee is treated as a third party 
beneficiary, the result would seem to be the same as it is in the cases 
where there is no consideration or a failure of consideration. 
The failure of consideration problem may arise if the union breaks 
its promises. Can a custom thus easily be broken? If a custom can be 
established by a definite act there is no apparent reason why it cannot be 
disestablished by an equally definite act. If the latter is true, it would 
seem that the worker who continues to work in spite of, say, the strike, 
cannot maintain his suit, unless those cases in which the custom exists 
regardless of consideration set the precedent to be followed here. The 
union-as-agent notion breeds an equally nice question. The agent has 
broken the agreement, the principal has not. Or did the principal promise 
the employer personally that there would be no strikes? Then the agent's 
striking is a breach of the principal's promise even though the principal 
himself keeps on working while the agent is on strike. Perhaps, in order 
to make more sense, we had better read it to mean only that the principal 
will not participate in a strike. But if the employee is a third party, shall 
he continue to benefit even when the promisor has broken his promise to 
the promisee? The underlying bargain has been broken; presumably it 
is gone completely. The analysis would yield a negative answer to the 
question except for the effect of an analogous situation. 
Suppose the employer and the union get together and agree, during the 
term of the contract, that changes shall be made. The custom has changed, 
to be sure, but the employee agreed to work according to the terms of the 
old custom. It might be urged on this ground that he retains his rights 
in spite of the change. But since in all probability he is employed at will, 
is not his employment from this day forth in terms of the new custom, 
that way of doing things that is so well known, so certain, so stable, and 
so oft-repeated that men are presumed to have contracted with reference 
to it ? Perhaps, but the answer is far from clear. If, however, the employee 
is principal and the union is agent, we run into still another question, that 
of the authority of the union to make changes for him.'26 He denies the 
authority to make this change, for it works to his detriment. But, as a 
loyal member of the union, has he not agreed beforehand to acquiesce 
in anything the majority does? Then perhaps he has agreed though he 
disagrees, and he has to take the change whether he likes it or not. But 
the third party beneficiary, it is laid down in case and text, acquires his 
rights as soon as the underlying agreement comes into existence and 
nothing can thereafter change them unless-and here is a lovely spot for 
an implication !-the privilege of changing has been reserved in the first 
place. So, unless we can spell waiver out of his being a member of the 
union, the employer is still obligated to him even though his organization 
125. See Young v. Canadian Northern Ry., [1931] A. C. 83, (P. C.) 
126. Cf. Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904). 
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has told the employer to make certain changes against which he now pro- 
tests. If, however, this third-party beneficiary is not a member of the 
union, by what doctrinal device can his recovery on the old agreement be 
circumvented? There is none apparent at first glance unless, as before, 
the privilege of changing has been reserved or can be found by impli- 
cation. 127 
But on this question we can check the accuracy of our deductions-or 
the adequacy of the concepts with which we started, or the degree of 
seriousness with which these concepts laid down by the courts are entitled 
to be taken-against a few cases. 
Here is the Kentucky court, for instance.'28 A union member is suing 
his employer and his union. It appears that he was in the minority when 
his local asked the railroad-employer if it would not agree to a change 
in runs. The railroad agreed without any hesitation. Without discussing 
how, in the first place, the plaintiff acquired his seniority "right" or what 
sort of a "right" it is that is being disturbed, the court takes the position 
that the "right" cannot be changed by mere concurrence of the principal 
parties to the agreement. 
"This contention [that plaintiff ought to act like a loyal member 
of the union; that he is bound by its acts] ignores the fact that such 
agreements between organizations of employes and their employer 
are designed primarily for the individual benefit of the members of 
the organization, and not to place it within the power of the organ- 
ization to change or modify the contract at its pleasure so as to 
affect the individual rights of its members theretofore secured by the 
agreement . . . Their agreements with employers look always to the 
securing of some right or privilege for their individual members, and 
the right or privilege so secured by agreement is the individual right 
of the individual member, and such organization can no more by its 
arbitrary act deprive that individual member of his right so secured 
than can any other person. The organization is not the agent of the 
member for the purpose of waiving any rights he may have, but is 
only his representative for the limited purpose of securing to him, 
together with all other members, fair and just wages and good work- 
ing conditions . . . 
"If the right of seniority may be changed or waived or otherwise 
dispensed with by the act of a bare majority of an organization to 
which the one entitled thereto is a member, it would be builded upon 
a flimsy foundation of sand which might slip from under him at any 
127. Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655 (1935); Franklin v. Pennsyl- 
vania-TReading Seashore Lines, 122 N. J. Eq. 205, 193 Atl. 712 (1937) (non-union men 
affected by changes in the agreement itself or in its interpretation). 
128. Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923). See 
Rolandez v. Star Liquor Dealers, 3 L. R. R. 229 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). 
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time by the arbitrary action of the members, possibly to serve their 
own selfish ends in displacing him."'29 
Taking a contrary position, and possibly using equally and unjustifiably 
broad language,130 is the Massachusetts court :131 
"The substantial issue is whether the [seniority] rights of the 
plaintiffs are fixed by the terms of the agreement between the union 
and the railroad corporation as it stood when the several plaintiffs 
entered upon their service, interpreted only in the light then avail- 
able; or whether as the agreements changed from time to time, the 
modifications and possible changes in interpretation of terms agreed 
upon by the union and the railroad corporation modified and affected 
the individual contracts of those already in the corporation's employ. 
We think the latter to be the proper position. The transaction is an 
agreement between an employer and a labor union designed by the 
latter to benefit itself and those members who enter the employer's 
service. If it modified the agreement with the employer, the employee 
129. Perhaps the broad language, apparently applicable to all changes in collective 
bargains, will be limited to attempted changes in seniority rights. Id. at 1045; Yazoo & 
Miss. Valley R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594, 607; 161 So. 860, 861 (1935). By much 
the same argument as that used in the principal case, it has also been held that where, 
under a collective bargain provision, the plaintiff lost his seniority by accepting transfer 
to another department, he could not take advantage of a subsequent change in the 
agreement striking out this rule. McGregor v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 244 Ky. 
696, 51 S. W. (2d) 953 (1932). 
130. For the case may fall in with one of two classes of "changes" which the courts 
generally uphold, viz., changes arising from "interpretation" of the agreement, and changes 
necessitated, as in the instant case, by consolidation, merger, and the like in the railroad 
itself. For examples, see Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 Atl. 655 (1935) 
(acquiescence or participation in making the change), Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 
213 N. W. 366 (1927) (failure to exhaust remedies within the union), Burton v. Oregon- 
Washington Navigation Co., 148 Ore. 648, 38 P. (2d) 72 (1934) (interpretation of 
agreement). For the most part in these cases the employer is a nominal party; the 
true defendant is the union alone. 
One of the great advantages-as will be seen by comparing the struggles of the 
Kentucky court in Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920) and McGregor 
v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S. W. (2d) 953 (1932)--of allowing 
the union officers to interpret the agreement and give it a practical application is that 
it avoids all the difficulties of judicial inquiry into highly technical and often tersely 
worded collective bargains and substitutes for this something approximating an expert 
commission's interpretation of the same. This has gone so far that in Chicago, Rock 
Island & Pacific Ry. v. Sawyer, 176 Okla. 446, 56 P. (2d) 418 (1936) it was held 
that plaintiff's reliance on defendant's interpretation of the seniority provisions of an 
agreement between it and the union (of which plaintiff was a member) to the effect 
that he (plaintiff) would not lose his seniority if he accepted transfer to another job, 
avails him nothing if the parties (plaintiff and defendant) were mistaken as to its 
meaning as understood by the union and later agreed to by defendant. 
131. Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934). See Hartley v. 
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885 (1938). 
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must acquiesce. In no correct sense is the union an agent. It is a 
principal . . " 132 
These cases suggest a converse problem: May the member-or the 
non-member-contract out of the provisions of the agreement? If so, 
what effect will this have on the union's being able to maintain a suit? 
If we say that the agreement is, for the individual, a custom, surely he 
can agree to terms other than those there set forth. If we say that he is 
a third-party beneficiary, the same result will probably follow. If we say 
that he is a principal and the union an agent, cannot the principal and 
the other contracting party call off the agreement? Undoubtedly yes, 
unless, as is extremely unlikely, agency coupled with an interest can be 
spelled out of the relationship between the union and its members. But the 
custom may be a contract between the principal parties, the agent may 
turn out to be a principal if it sues to enforce the agreement itself and 
the union is clearly entitled to sue if the third party agrees to take less 
than the agreement calls for. On the effect on the enforcement of the 
bargain by the union of a member's agreeing to terms lower than those 
of the agreement, we have no case law. But on its effect on the member's 
own suit we do. 
The tendency of the cases is pretty clearly in the direction of saying 
that an inconsistent agreement between employer and employee is no bar 
to the latter's suing on the collective bargain. Only one decision, however, 
adopts the rule as a rule.'33 The others go on the ground that the private 
bargain was made without knowledge of the collective agreement134 or 
that the quantum of evidence required to show that the inconsistent pro- 
posal was accepted by the worker is, apparently, greater than usual.135 
132. Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 173, 188 N. E. 705, 708 (1934). A good 
deal of ink has been spilled trying to define the "nature" of seniority rights under 
collective agreements. See, for instance, Judge Hutcheson's concurring opinion in Estes 
v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. (2d) 768, 774 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). Compare Burger 
v. McCarthy, 84 W. Va. 697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919) with Gleason v. Thomas, 117 W. Va. 
550, 186 S. E. 304 (1936); cf. McMurray v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 50 F. 
(2d) 968, 970 (W. D. Pa. 1931); Burton v. Oregon-Washington Navigation Co., 148 
Ore. 648, 38 P. (2d) 72 (1934). 
133. Reichert v. Quindazzi, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 284 (Mun. Ct. 1938). 
134. Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914). But 
cf. Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. Supp. 388 (4th 
Dep't 1910). There is considerable dictum in the cases-see, e.g., Cross Mountain Coal 
Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 468, 9 S. W. (2d) 692, 694 (1928), cited note 118 supra- 
intimating that explicit employer-employee agreement will prevail over an employer- 
union contract. 
135. Dierschow v. West Suburban Dairies, 275 Ill. App. 355 (1934). But cf. Shuppan 
v. Peoria Ry. Terminal Co., 30 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929). Compare the results 
reached on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction in Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. R. 
v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931) and Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. R. 
v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) (both involving wage disputes) with 
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Probably without the aid of statute no better result than that indicated by 
these latter cases can be worked out. It may be, however, that the rule 
of the Restatement, holding unenforceable a bargain which is inconsistent 
with an earlier contract and made with knowledge of the inconsistency, 
can be put to useful work here, however absurd it may be thought to be 
as a general proposition.'36 In any event the analogy to the minimum- 
wage statutes, heretofore stressed, will suggest the desirable result to be 
achieved by the courts, if not the rule of law to be applied.'3 
The discussion so far has turned around the concept of rights acquired 
by the individual employee under the collective agreement and their modi- 
fication by agreement between the principal parties to the bargain. Sup- 
pose, however, that the employer is asserting that the individual employee 
owes him a duty under the agreement. How do the standard doctrines 
work out here? Custom will probably give the employer the result he 
wants. So will agency. The only hitch comes with third-party beneficiary 
doctrine. The third-party is a beneficiary, not an obligor. Unless we can 
say that his acceptance of the benefits of the agreement carries with it 
the duties as well,'38 we run into difficulties. 
But there has not, in practice, been much disagreement among the 
courts on this question. When the Massachusetts court was asked to en- 
join a defendant union member from violating a provision in the agree- 
ment between the plaintiff-former employer and the union that men leaving 
plaintiff's employ would not work for a competitor, or for themselves 
as competitors during the next 90 days, it announced, without an attempt 
to spin out doctrine, that defendant, having been familiar with the agree- 
ment and having been employed by plaintiff as a union member, was bound 
by this term of the agreement.139 A New York court took the same 
conclusion for granted, after defendant admitted that the contract be- 
tween plaintiff and the union had been made, that he was a member of 
the organization, and that he had the duty, if any, cast on him by the 
the "non-waiver" teaching of the Missouri court in McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Ry., 
229 Mo. App. 506, 77 S. W. (2d) 175 (1934). 
136. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) ? 576; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) 
? 1738; Lauterpacht, Contracts to Break a Contract (1936) 52 LAW Q. REV. 494. 
137. On the supersession of an employer-employee bargain by the union-employer 
agreement, see Strobe v. Netherland Co., 245 App. Div. 573, 283 N. Y. Supp. 246 
(4th Dep't 1935); Individual Damp Wash Laundry Co. v. Meyers, 2 L. R. R. 162 
(Ohio C. P. 1938). 
138. Not to be confused is the situation in Flyum v. Alaska Packers' Association, 
5 Alaska 200 (1914) where plaintiff sued in quantum meruit, measured by terms of 
collective agreement, for work done in absence of another. Held: "Plaintiff . . . was 
not a party to this [agreement], and was not bound by its terms, nor can he come in 
under its terms, claiming its benefits, while refusing to recognize its obligations, on his 
part to be performed"; plaintiff takes only what he agreed to accept under his individual 
contract. 
139. Whiting Milk Co. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N. E. 379 (1933). 
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agreement.140 The same was true in a Pennsylvania case in which the 
defendant employer, sued for wages, sought to withhold an amount equal 
to the "fine" of a dollar a day provided in the bargain for the event of 
an unauthorized strike.141 Different, it seems, is the position of a non- 
union member, for the Kentucky court has held in Gregg v. Starks142 
that, since he was not a party to an agreement between a railroad and the 
union to arbitrate differences, he could not be bound by the arbitration 
award. 
None of these is a strong case; most appear to be simple assertions by 
the court without issue raised. A more difficult problem comes in deciding 
whether the burdens of the agreement can be got rid of by resignation 
from an employers' association or from a union and whether, by a similar 
resignation, rights are lost. Customs go on willy-nilly and withdrawal 
might be expected to make no difference. If the agency be a continuing 
one-a series of acts constructively repeated day after day and week 
after week-resignation might divest the member of his rights and duties; 
but if the work of the agent was an act done once and for all, there would 
be no such effect. And the third-party beneficiary, if he would have come 
within the terms of the agreement without having been a member in the 
first place, would presumably continue to be such even after he had re- 
signed. Contrariwise, if membership was a prerequisite to inclusion 
within the terms of the agreement, his subsequent withdrawal would 
make a difference. Most of the cases that have considered the matter 
allow this mode of escape,143 but the recent swing appears to be in the 
other direction.144 
WVe have, finally, one other question: It is to be noticed that suits 
brought by individual employees under collective agreements have centered 
around three problems exclusively- wages, seniority and wrongful dis- 
charge. Is this to be taken to mean that these, and similar, questions are 
the only ones that may be litigated by the individual or does it mean 
140. Eastchester Cleaners v. Platek, 95 N. Y. L. J. 2438 (Sup. Ct. 1936). Accord: 
Western-United Dairy Co. and Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Nash, 293 Ill. App. 162, 
12 N. E. (2d) 47 (1938). For the same assumption or finding, as to employers who 
were members of associations with which plaintiff unions had trade agreements, see 
Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 178, 282 N. Y. Supp. 622, 623 (Sup. 
Ct. 1936); Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 718, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807, 809 (Sup. Ct. 
1924). 
141. Henderson v. The Cambria Smokeless Coal Co., 20 D. & C. 654 (C. P. 1934). 
Compare the use of the collective bargain as a defense by the employer, notes 115, 117 
rupra. 
142. Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 838; 224 S. W. 459, 460 (1920). 
143. Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry., 37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928); Ryan 
v. Tuttle-Jones Co., 3 LAW AND LABOR 139 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1921); Blagg Co. v. 
Rettig, 24 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 546 (1923). 
144. Supra note 90. Cf. United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 
7th, 1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714 (1936). 
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merely that they are the only ones that have been so litigated? To put it 
another way, may the individual sue on the collective agreement to pro- 
tect any interest that by any possibility may accrue to him under the agree- 
ment, or does enforcement of some provisions belong to the union exclu- 
sively? May the individual, for instance, sue to enjoin breach of an agree- 
ment to run closed shop, or does that privilege to sue belong to the 
union? Conversely, if the individual sues for wages-more strongly, if 
a number of individuals, sue for wages-may the union organization agree 
with the employer to waive this portion of the bargain? One can imagine 
instances where the union might well be justified in making some arrange- 
ment even after the individual's asserted ''rights" had accrued to him; 
one can also imagine instances in which a perverse or lackadaisical union 
leadership, solidly entrenched, would fail to assert proper claims against 
the employer to the detriment of the union membership. The answer to 
this sort of question is yet to be found. But the analysis we have already 
gone through makes it clear that no satisfactory solution lies in the ques- 
tion-begging assertion of the Louisiana court'45 that 
"The plaintiff is limited to an enforcement of his individual rights 
under the contract. He cannot champion the rights of the local 
union as a whole." 
Probably the answer was a good one in the particular instance. Probably 
also the solution lies in a working out of some trade union equivalent to 
the stockholder's suit in corporate law. In any event the solution, if there 
is any and whatever it is, lies in the future. 
We come, then, practically to the point at which we started. To at- 
tempt to write about or to state "the law of the collective bargain" as it 
applies to the individual employee is to attempt to write about or to state 
something which does not exist. True, there are cases, perhaps a hundred 
or so all told. But there is no body of doctrine, in any sense of the word, 
to which reference can be made to predict the outcome of as yet unsettled 
questions. It can hardly even be said that there are standards, let alone 
a frame, of reference. We are still engaged, in this domain of enforce- 
ment of individual rights and duties under the agreement, in threshing 
out even the barest fundamentals of law. Older cases carry little weight 
and the meaning of new ones, for lack of a context, is indeterminate. A 
particular point here and there is being "settled," but how long it will 
remain settled is still to be seen. No well thought out line of attack, such 
as existed fifteen or twenty years ago when Walter Gordon Merritt and 
a flourishing League for Industrial Rights were engaged in developing 
a vast body of legal obstacles to labor's ambitions, exhibits itself in the 
cases either from labor's side or from that of the employer. Rather we 
145. Volquardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., 156 So. 678 (La. App. 1934). 
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have what is assumed to be the proper method for developing a common 
law on any subject-cases coming haphazardly to the courts, counsel 
changing from case to case, no firm assertion, no iteration and reiteration, 
of "principles" which, even in our stage of the game, will have to be 
threshed out if there is to be certainty under collective bargaining. Pre- 
sumably we have got beyond the stage of arguing whether collective agree- 
ments ought to be enforced at law. But we have not got far beyond it, 
Verbalisms abound and old formulae are turned to or ignored as seems 
best at the moment. Perhaps the Massachusetts court, seeming to ignore 
the words that other courts resort to-"custom", "agent", "third party 
beneficiary"-is taking the wiser course in choosing a comparatively new 
and untainted word-"member"'"46-and filling it up with content as the 
cases come. Deliberately chosen or not, consciously or unconsciously, some 
such route as this will have to be, and is being, followed by the other courts 
as well. And this, I take it, is the common law equivalent of M. Duguit's 
warning to the French legislators of twenty years ago: 
"The truth is that although collective labor contracts have multi- 
plied . . . the time has not yet come for legislative action. We have 
here an institution which is still in the process of formation and is 
far from its complete development."'147 
146. Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934); Whiting Milk Co. 
v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N. E. 379 (1933). 
147. Supra note 1, at 766. 
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